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The Battle of the Rosebud
and the Contribution
of the Swiss Captain
Alexander Johann Sutorius
by Albert Winkler

T

he Battle of the Rosebud was one of the most significant engagements between the United States Army and the Native Americans in the
history of the American West. It was a close contest, and the participation
of many courageous men in the army made a big difference. This number
included Captain Alexander Johann Sutorius from Switzerland who made
valuable contributions for the army in both the campaign and battle.
The Battle of the Rosebud took place on June 17, 1876, and was
the largest single encounter between the United States cavalry and Indian
forces in terms of numbers in the entire history of the American West.
It was a fierce encounter that lasted about six hours and involved several
thousand cavalrymen and Indian warriors. The outcome of the contest was
highly significant because it turned back a major army attack against the
Indians and freed many warriors to engage another invading force under
the command of George Armstrong Custer. This led to the destruction of
much of Custer’s command at the Battle of the Little Bighorn by a much
superior enemy on June 25, 1876. One of the participants in the Rosebud
encounter, Lieutenant Charles Morton, stated, with perhaps a small
exaggeration as to numbers, that the conflict “was probably the greatest
Indian battle in our history—some 1,400 sodiers and friendly Indians
against some 5,000 hostiles.”1 Because Custer’s defeat took place only

Charles Morton Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States.
vol. 15: 1316.
1
1
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1868 Peace Commission, Fort Laramie. Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.
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eight days after the Battle of the Rosebud, the earlier engagement has
been largely overlooked and has not been given the attention it deserves.2

Captain Sutorius
According to his military records, Alexander Johann Sutorius, who
later participated so significantly in the battle, was born in the village
of Guienne, Switzerland, on May 7, 1837. His last name is Latin for
shoemaker. There is a slight discrepancy because the federal census of
1900 states that he was born in May of 1836. Since the name “Guienne”
has not been found in any gazetteer of Switzerland, the actual name of his
home town may be in question, but there is no doubt as to his national
origin. The federal census of 1900 confirms that he, his father, and his
mother were all born in Switzerland.3 When Sutorius approached early
manhood, the economic condition of his home country was considered
to be weak, and many young Swiss left the nation of their birth for greater
opportunities in other countries. The United States was a big draw for
many of them.
The Swiss, Sutorius, was still in his teens when he arrived in New
York City on April 10, 1854. Reportedly, he was on the vessel the Samuel B.
Fox upon his arrival, but his name does not appear on the ship’s manifest.
Military service was an option for some immigrants because they often
lacked other opportunities including certain occupations that tended to
go to those born in the U.S. The army’s pay was low, the conditions of
service were frequently challenging, and society often gave soldiers little
respect. Also, boredom and fatigue were among the constants of military
service. But the occupation was secure, housing was provided, and food
Important studies of the battle include: J. W. Vaughn, With Crook at the Rosebud (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska, 1987); Neil C. Mangum Battle of the Rosebud: Prelude
to the Little Bighorn (El Segundo, Calif.: Upton, 1987); and Paul L. Hedren, Rosebud,
June 17, 1876: Prelude to the Little Big Horn (Norman, Okla.: U of Oklahoma, 2019).
3
Alexander Johann Sutorius https://www.familysearch.org accessed July 4,
2021. For biographical information on Sutorius, see Francis B. Heitman, Military
Register and Dictionary of the United States 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing, 1903) 1: 69, 937; Vaughn, With Crook, 180; and “Fiddler’s Green: Alexander
J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com accessed January 27, 2021.
2
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Great Sioux Reservation. Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.
was available even though its quality was often poor. For many immigrants
like Sutorius, the army gave them the opportunity to learn English and
make something of themselves in their new country.4
Sutorius joined the army in New York shortly after his arrival in
that city. He formally enlisted on September 15, 1854, as a musician
for the Regiment of Mounted Rifles. The fact that he was recruited as a
For general studies on the U.S. Army in the West, see Don Rickey, Jr., Forty
Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars (Norman,
Okla.: U of Oklahoma Press, 1963) and Douglas C. McChristian, Regular Army O!:
Soldiering on the Western Frontier, 1865-1891 (Norman, Okla.: U of Oklahoma Press,
2019).
4
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musician speaks well of his abilities. Few soldiers could play any kind of
musical instrument at that time, and his talent indicated he had some
formal training and a good education in his native land. His enlistment
was for five years. When men joined the service, they were measured
and described. He was listed as five feet eight inches tall, which was
about average height for men in his generation, and he also had hazel
(brown-green) eyes, brown hair, and a dark skin hue. Even though he was
stationed in harsh climates under challenging circumstances, the Swiss
found it convenient to rejoin the army at the end of his term of service.
He reenlisted on September 1, 1859, at Fort Union in the New Mexico
Territory, where his unit was contending with the Apaches, to serve as a
regimental bugler.5
The U.S. Army was long hampered by limited funding by Congress,
which was budget conscious, meaning that advancements in rank
were hard to achieve due to a lack of funds, and many enlisted men
remained privates even after significant years of service. This situation
changed dramatically when the Civil War broke out in 1861, and more
opportunities for advancement became available to professional soldiers.
At the start of the war, the U.S. Army numbered only about 16,000 men,
but it rapidly grew to one million men. A total of two million men would
serve in the Union Army before the war’s end. This explosion in numbers
meant that experienced soldiers were badly needed for leadership roles,
and many of them moved up rapidly in rank. Sutorius was among those
who were so fortunate.
When he was still in the New Mexico Territory, the Swiss became
the quartermaster sergeant of the regiment and advanced to the rank of
sergeant major on July 17, 1862. By the end of that year, his unit was
dispatched to Memphis, Tennessee, where he achieved the officer’s rank of
second lieutenant on April 22, 1863. As a “dependable soldier,” Sutorius was
given positions of “great responsibility,” and he would serve as regimental
adjutant, commissary officer, and quartermaster for a period of six years.6

“Fiddler’s Green: Alexander J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com
accessed on January 27, 2021.
6
Heitman, Military Register, 69 and Hedren, Rosebud, 41.
5
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He would also serve in Company E of the 3rd U.S. Cavalry for most of
the remainder of his military career. His regiment saw action in numerous
campaigns during the war including a battle at Tuscumbia, Alabama, in
October 1863. As a reward for his courage in that action, Sutorius was
awarded a brevet, or temporary advancement in rank to first lieutenant.
Aside from campaigning in Tennessee and Alabama, his unit was also
deployed in Missouri and Arkansas. On October 9, 1865, shortly after the
war, his temporary rank of first lieutenant was made permanent.7
Sutorius was sent back to New Mexico with his unit after occupying
Arkansas at the end of the war. He then was given leave to return East to get
married. Somewhere along the line the Lieutenant met and courted Mercy
Thompkins from New York. The couple was married on August 19, 1866,
when Sutorius was 29 or 30 years old. According to the federal census of
1900, Mercy was born in November of 1849. If accurate, she was 16 at
the time of her marriage, and her husband was 13 or 14 years older. Such
age disparities were not uncommon at that time, but they were not exactly
usual either. Apparently, the couple had a successful marriage, and they
reportedly “had four children, Camille, Ford, Francis Alexis and Frances
Eugenia.”8 Yet according to the 1900 federal census, Mercy had given birth
to only three children, and all three were still alive at the time of the census.9
On May 6, 1869, Sutorius was promoted to the rank of captain
and given command of Company E, in the 3rd Cavalry, a position he
would hold for the remainder of his military career. He served in the
American Southwest to deal largely with the Apaches until 1872 when
he was deployed to Nebraska and the Wyoming Territory to contend
with the plains Indians, most prominently in the General George Crook’s
campaign of 1876 and the Battle of the Rosebud.10

“Fiddler’s Green: Alexander J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com
accessed on January 27, 2021.
8
“Fiddler’s Green: Alexander J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com
accessed on January 27, 2021.
9
Mercy Thompkins https://www.familysearch.org accessed on July 4, 2021.
10
“Fiddler’s Green: Alexander J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com
accessed on January 27, 2021.
7
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Background to the War
The Battle of the Rosebud was a major engagement of the Great
Sioux War of 1876-7, which was caused largely by the aggressive,
dishonest, and often callous policies of the United States government
toward the native peoples of North America. In 1868, Red Cloud of
the Oglala Sioux (also known as the Oglala Lakota) negotiated the
Treaty of Fort Laramie with the United States. The treaty ended two
years of war between the Sioux and the white Americans and was
designed to assure peaceful relations between the two adversaries. The
agreement specified that many lands in the modern states of Nebraska,
Wyoming, Montana, and South Dakota would remain in the hands of
the indigenous peoples. This included the Black Hills of South Dakota,
which were the most sacred lands of all the Sioux groups and were
considered to be the center of their universe. Not only did all military
posts in these areas have to be abandoned, but the treaty clearly stated
that no unauthorized white person “shall ever be permitted to pass over,
settle upon, or reside in the territory.” This issue was so important that
it was repeated again in the document: “It also stipulates and agrees
that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or
occupy any portion of [the lands or] to pass through [them].”11
The United States had little interest in keeping the treaty for long,
and the federal government soon broke the agreement. A glaring example
of a treaty violation came in 1874 when George Armstrong Custer took
the 7th Cavalry into the area on the Black Hills Expedition. The reasons for
the incursion seemed to be innocent because Custer’s men were supposedly
on Sioux lands to explore, to survey a new route near Fort Laramie, and to
find a good site for a fort. But the expedition was illegal because it violated
the treaty agreements stipulating that no unauthorized entry into Sioux
lands was allowed. Also, the search for a location of a fort would be a
further breach of the agreement if such a post was established. Technically
speaking, the undertaking was a military invasion and an act of war. Many

“Treaty with the Sioux . . .1868” as cited in Indian Treaties 1778-1883,
Charles J. Kappler, ed. (New York: Interland, 1972), 998 and 1002-3.
11
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civilians who accompanied the expedition came looking for gold as well.
When these prospectors found gold, the news spread rapidly and set off a
gold rush in which many white men rushed into the sacred Black Hills.12
As many white prospectors rushed into Sioux lands, and the federal
government made feeble, if any, efforts to restrain them, the Treaty of
Fort Laramie was becoming a dead letter. War would no doubt soon
ensue, and the U.S. government tried diplomatic initiatives to deflect
criticism from their actions. The government brought a delegation of
prominent Sioux, including Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, to Washington,
D.C., in late spring 1875 to negotiate with them. The bureaucrats in
Washington brought the leaders by train giving them the opportunity to
see the vastness of the country, to be impressed with the size of the white
population, and to be impressed by their extensive resources. The Sioux
met with President Ulysses S. Grant, the “Great White Father,” on May
26, and “the old general lost no time in laying down the law of might
makes right.” Grant told the chiefs that the white people outnumbered
them by 200 to 1, and the disparity in numbers would only continue to
grow. The Sioux’s condition was hopeless. They could not restrain their
adversaries, and the native peoples would have to leave their lands and be
resettled elsewhere.13
Many officials of the government thought that no further concessions
should be made to the Sioux and that the protection of the white people
was the most important consideration. General George Crook, who later
led the United States forces at the Battle of the Rosebud, believed that
the federal forces should be used to support the settlers and miners who
were illegally invading Sioux lands. He said that they should be under the
nation’s protection.14
On the next day, the delegation met with Columbus Delano, the
Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Edwin
For more on the expedition, see Ernest Grafe and Paul Horsted, Exploring
with Custer: The 1874 Black Hills Expedition (Custer, S.D.: Golden Valley, 2005).
13
John Hunton, Diaries of John Hunton, Michael Griske, ed. (Westminster,
Md.: Heritage, 2008), 67-8.
14
George Crook, “Letter,” September 15, 1875, as cited in Charles M. Robinson, General Crook and the Western Frontier (Norman: U. of Oklahoma, 2001), 162.
12
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General George Crook on the Trail by Frederic Remington.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

P. Smith, who continued the effort of intimidation. Delano said that
the Sioux were receiving funds from the government, and he told the
chiefs, “Now if you don’t do what’s right, Congress will refuse to give you
any more aid.”15 The government offered them only $25,000 for their
lands, and they would have to move to the Indian Territory in what is
now Oklahoma. This amount of money was a tiny sum for the tens of
15

Delano as cited in Diaries of John Hunton, 68.
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thousands of square miles the Sioux would have to surrender, and Spotted
Tail treated this cheap bribe with contempt. He said he still wanted to
abide by the Treaty of Fort Laramie, but the white men did not. The chief
clearly wanted to stay on the lands that belonged to him and his people,
and he commented wryly, “If it [the other land] is such a good country,
you ought to send the white men now in our country there, and leave us
alone.”16 The wrangling over an agreement to steal land from the Sioux
went on for weeks, but failed to reach the desired goals of the government,
and no new treaty was negotiated. The chiefs left on July 4.
The federal government made another attempt to negotiate a favorable
settlement. Special commissioners, which included Commissioner Smith
and United States Senator William B. Allison, met the Sioux at Fort
Robinson, Nebraska, on September 20, 1875. Many of the native peoples
refused to negotiate at the post fearing that they would be forced to make
a treaty under duress, so they finally met at White River, eight miles away.
The meeting included a huge number of Sioux and other native peoples.
Anson Mills, a cavalry officer who was at the conference, estimated that
20,000 Indians were present. He thought the natives at the meeting
represented “probably 40,000 to 45,000 [people] of various tribes.”
Perhaps three quarters of the adult males of these peoples were at the
conference.17 No doubt, thousands of these men were potential warriors.
Senator Allison opened the remarks, and he began to make a speech
about the surrender of the Sioux lands. The federal government offered
the Indians six million dollars for their lands, but the native peoples were
long used to the many lies by the white men. Red Cloud was in no mood
to negotiate with government officials he could not trust, and he made
impossible demands. He required that the United States give clothing and
food to the Sioux for seventy generations and pay the then astronomical
sum of six hundred million dollars.18
The negotiations continued for two weeks with heated debates
among the various Sioux groups that led to some fights among them. It
Spotted Tail as cited in the Diaries of John Hunton, 69.
Anson Mills, My Story, (Washington, D.C.: Adams, 1918), 167.
18
Charles M. Robinson, A Good Year to Die: the Story of the Great Sioux War
(New York: Random House, 1995), 39-40.
16
17
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was expected that Red Cloud and Spotted Tail would support giving up
the areas if the price was right, but the entire idea of surrendering sacred
lands infuriated many of the warriors. Even before Red Cloud spoke, Little
Big Man “rode between the commission and the seated Indian chiefs” on
his horse. He wore war headgear, and he had two revolvers attached to a
cord around his waist. He was obviously agitated, and he threatened, “I
will kill the first Indian chief who speaks favorably to the selling of the
Black Hills.” Anson Mills estimated that “at least half the men warriors
pressed about us threatening to kill some member of the commission.”
Fearing for their lives, the members of the delegation retreated back to
the fort. Clearly, there was no chance for a negotiated settlement at that
point, and Mills believed war would break out in the spring.19
Others agreed with this sad assessment of the situation, and the
government set in motion plans that led to hostilities. On November
3, 1875, President Grant met with his important military and civilian
leaders who were responsible for controlling Indians in the West. These
men agreed that the miners must have access to the Black Hills, and
the native peoples would have to leave, by the use of military force if
necessary. This meant that the Indians had to leave the disputed lands
and, in effect, surrender them to the government without compensation.
The Department of the Interior sent instructions to its Indian agents on
December 6, 1875, to tell all the Sioux, and other tribes associated with
agencies in the Nebraska and Dakota areas, to report to their reservations
by January 31, 1876. If the Indians failed to do so, they would be
considered hostile, which meant they were subject to military action that
would force them to go to the agencies.20
These orders were totally impractical. Many of the Indian agents
did not receive the letters until the end of December, and, frequently, the
information was not forwarded to the Indians until days or weeks later.
Few of the natives were able to come to the agencies within the time limit
because of severe winter weather, and the government had insufficient
resources to feed them even if they arrived on time. Out of necessity,

19
20

Mills, My Story, 167-8.
Robinson, General Crook, 162-3.
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many of the hungry Indians soon left the posts in search of food. The
fact that the Indians either could not come to the posts, or were forced to
suffer when they arrived, meant that they could not meet the orders that
restricted them to the agencies.21 In effect, this call for the native peoples
to come to the posts was a cruel trick and a virtual declaration of war
against them.
Ben Arnold, who fought in the war as a scout and was a keen observer,
assessed the situation well. He realized that the federal government tried
to justify its actions of taking the land by going to war, and he stated that
“the smoke of battle has screened many a high-handed territory seizure.”
In the face of the invasion, the “fighting of the Indians did was in selfdefense.” He added succinctly, “Of all the wars in which the United States
has been engaged, the least justification is found in the Sioux War of
1876. The Interior Department can never wash its hands of this crime.”22
The largest Indian war in the history of the American West, which cost
many hundreds of lives, was set in motion because the government stole
the land that had been granted to the Sioux forever.
General Philip Sheridan was in command over the Department
of Missouri, and was, therefore, responsible for planning the upcoming
campaign. Short in stature “Little Phil,” who was five feet five inches
tall, was known as a brutal commander during the American Civil War
especially when he oversaw the destruction of the Shenandoah Valley
of Virginia in 1864. He soon brought his callous policies of dealing
with his enemies to the West. Sheridan probably popularized the most
cruel of all statements regarding the American Indians when he was
speaking with Toch-a-way (Turtle Dove) of the Comanches in 1869.
According to Captain Charles Nordstrom, who was an eyewitness,
the chief assured the General of his peaceful intentions. He struck
himself on the chest and stated, “Me, Toch-a-way; me good Injun.” In
an observation that set the whites at the scene roaring with laughter,

Robinson, The Great Sioux War, 43-5.
Ben Arnold, Rekindling Camp Fires: The Exploits of Ben Arnold (Connor),
Lewis F. Crawford, ed. (Bismarck, N.D.: Capital, 1926), 239-40.
21
22
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Sheridan responded, “The only good Indians I ever saw were dead.” 23
This comment was soon shortened to “The only good Indian is a dead
Indian.” Sheridan later denied making the remark, but these words
clearly represented his well-known hatred for native peoples and his
desire to see them treated harshly. 24 No doubt, this callous sentiment
had long been held by many whites, and the phrase “a good Indian,”
meant a dead Native American.
Phil Sheridan believed that the army should strike the Indians as
soon as possible in the harsh winter conditions when they would be more
vulnerable to attacks because they could only move with difficulty in the
challenging weather. He chose General George Crook to lead part of the
operation to subdue the Sioux.25 Crook has often been considered the
most experienced and most effective Indian fighter in the history of the
American West, but his performance was frequently uneven. Sometimes,
he showed great competency and at other times inexplicable foolishness,
frequently on the same campaign. Sheridan and Crook had known each
other since childhood, and they had roomed together at the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point. The two men’s early friendship degenerated
into hatred and jealousy by 1876 largely because Crook was envious of
Sheridan’s greater success. Crook, at more than six feet tall, was a much
more domineering figure than “Little Phil,” and he often made fun of the
shorter man’s appearance and denigrated his leadership. While Sheridan
returned the ill will, he still thought Crook an able commander and gave
him important assignments.26
The Indians who left the reservations had little choice but to go
in search of large herds of buffalo (North American Bison) because the
animal was their main source of food. The buffalo had recently roamed the
Great Plains in America in their tens of millions, but hunters converged

Nordstrom as cited in Edward S. Ellis, The History of our Country (New York,
N.Y.: Whitten, 1900) 6: 1483.
24
Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army, (Lincoln, Neb.: U. of
Nebraska Press, 1985), 180.
25
For more on Crook see, George Crook, General George Crook: His Autobiography, Martin F. Schmitt ed. (Norman, Okla.: U. of Oklahoma Press, 1960).
26
Robinson, Great Sioux War, 56-7.
23
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Crook’s men at Fort Fetterman in the winter of 1876.
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on the animals in the 1870s and slaughtered them in huge numbers.27 The
federal authorities realized that the destruction of the bison would solve
what they considered to be the Indian problem, and government officials
often gave hunters free ammunition for their task. In 1875, Sheridan
praised the hunters, “These men have done in the last two years, and
will do more in the next year, to settle the vexed Indian question than
the entire regular army has done in the last thirty years. . . . Send them
powder and lead, if you will; but for the sake of a lasting peace let them
kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated.”28 Once these
animals were gone, the Indians would have little choice but to live on the
meager food supplies the government would give them. By 1876, there
were only a few thousand buffalo left, and most of these were found in
the area near the borders of the modern states of Wyoming, Montana, and
North and South Dakota. This was the last year when the Indians could
hope to live in their native environment and enjoy their culture because
the bison would soon be gone.29
On February 7, 1876, General Sheridan received orders to move
against the Sioux who were not on the reservations. Sheridan planned
a three-pronged attack on those areas to catch the Indians in a vice and
to crush them between various columns of soldiers. Alfred Terry, John
Gibbon, and George Crook led the expeditions. The eastern column
under General Alfred Terry, which included the 7th Cavalry led by George
Armstrong Custer, was ordered to leave Fort Abraham Lincoln in North
Dakota and march west. But Terry stated he could not get Custer’s unit
ready to march before spring, and severe weather also delayed his departure
until May. Sheridan ordered Colonel John Gibbon to advance from Fort
Ellis in the western areas of modern Montana in an easterly direction,
and the column left on March 17. The men marched through deep snow

The classic account of the destruction of the bison is Edward Douglas Branch,
The Hunting of the Buffalo (New York, N.Y.: Appleton, 1929).
28
Sheridan as cited in John R. Cook, The Border and the Buffalo: An Untold Story
of the Southwest Plains (Chicago, Ill.: Lakeside, 1938), 164.
29
For a more complex view on the destruction of the buffalo, see, Andrew C.
Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: an Environmental History, 1750-1920 (New
York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
27
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down the Yellowstone River and established a post at the mouth of the
Bighorn River, but the advance had little impact on the military situation
because the soldiers found no Indians. Only the southern column under
General George Crook, who took the field in March, located an Indian
village.30

The Big Horn Expedition
General Crook’s troops left Fort Fetterman on March 1, 1876, and
marched north. Crook planned to reach the Big Horn River and attack
any Indians he might encounter. His command included ten companies
of cavalry and two of infantry, which numbered all together about 900
men. The General asked the opinion of his scouts on the location of the
Indians, and Frank Grouard told him that a Sioux encampment was most
likely to be found on the Powder River. Crook asked the guide what made
him so certain. Grouard stated, “from my knowledge of the Indians and
their mode of living in the winter time. I knew where they ranged in
the winter time.” The next morning the General sent Grouard and other
scouts to reconnoiter the trail to the Tongue River, a short distance from
the Powder River, to see if any Indian camps were there.31
Captain Alexander Sutorius did not accompany this expedition, nor
did he participate in the Battle of Powder River. At that time, the Swiss
was at Fort D. A. Russel under arrest for unspecified charges.32
Shortly after the expedition left Fort Fetterman, Robert E. Strahorn,
a newspaper man who accompanied the troops, stated, “Some of our halfbreed scouts say that Crazy Horse . . . is only about seventy miles ahead
of us with a large number of warriors.” This war chief was famous for
advocating resisting the incursions of the whites onto Indian lands, and
he had “rode stark naked and armed to the teeth through the grounds
Hutton, Phil Sheridan, p. 302 and Paul L. Hedren, ed. The Great Sioux War
1876-77 (Helena, Mont.: Montana Historical Society, 1991), 12.
31
Frank Grouard, The Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard, Joe De Barth, ed.
(Norman, Okla.: U. of Oklahoma, 1958), 91.
32
Paul L. Hedren, Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War (Norman, Okla.: U of Oklahoma, 2018), 392.
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of the peace commission last summer and lifted up his voice for war.”33
Clearly, this man and his village were very tempting targets, and the desire
to attack them inspired the army to press forward even in the harshest
conditions and in the face of harassment from the enemy.
The General clearly believed that winter campaigns gave advantages
to the soldiers. When the snows were deep, his Indian adversaries were
less mobile meaning they could not easily flee, and they could more often
be attacked in their villages. The Indian ponies were smaller animals than
the larger cavalry mounts and walked through deep snow with greater
difficulty. While the army brought oats for its animals to eat on campaigns,
the ponies had to use their hooves to scrape away enough snow to eat
some grass. This made the Indian’s horses weak in the winter time, which
meant they could not be used in vigorous campaigns. These weakened
ponies reduced the biggest advantage of the native peoples, their ability
to run and to maneuver. When the cavalry found and attacked an Indian
village in the winter time, the soldiers had a distinct advantage in combat
because they had much better fire discipline and coordination than did
their adversaries. As Crook admitted, “The worse it [the weather] gets the
better; always hunt Indians in bad weather.”34
The Indians cleverly realized that attacking and seizing the army’s
food supply was a good means to slow its advance. The army column
brought a herd of cattle with it to be slaughtered for food, and a few
warriors struck the bovines early in the campaign. On March 2, a guard
was watching the herd of cattle at night when one of the troopers, Jim
Wright, saw “two or three Indians creeping toward him through the
sagebrush.” Several shots were fired and the warriors gave out “a number
of unearthly yells.” Even though the entire command was ordered to
assemble for battle, the Indians successfully took 50 cattle, and they left
Jim Wright mortally wounded. He had been shot through the lungs.35
Robert E. Strahorn, “The Indian War . . . March 3, 1876,” Rocky Mountain
News, 23 March 1876 as cited in Peter Cozzens ed. Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars,
1865-1890 (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 2004) 4: 206-8. Hereafter cited as Eyewitnesses.
34
Crook as quoted by Strahorn, Eyewitnesses, 207.
35
Crook as quoted by Strahorn, Eyewitnesses, 208.
33

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol57/iss3/5

20

et al.: Full Issue

November 2021 SAHS Review

18

In the evening of March 5, the Indians struck again. A group of
warriors tried to sneak to the soldier’s camp in an unsuccessful attempt
to stampede the horses. When the Indians were spotted, the troopers
opened fire, and both sides exchanged shots for nearly an hour. Initially,
the situation appeared to be dangerous for the soldiers because they were
standing near their camp fires when the first shots rang out, and they were
illuminated by the flames. But the men soon ran away from the light and
kept up a high rate of fire. The soldiers had difficulty seeing their targets
in the darkness, and “the way of returning their [the Indians’] fire was
to watch the flashes of their guns and send a bullet after the flash.” The
warriors seemed to fire accurately despite the darkness, and “bullets [were]
whizzing about our heads and sometimes lower, in a manner that was a
little more interesting than agreeable, especially to those of us who had
never been under fire until then.” Despite this relatively accurate fire, only
one trooper, Corporal Slavey, was wounded when a bullet went through
his cheek.36
Lieutenant John Bourke did not fear these petty engagements, and
he thought these skirmishes benefitted the army’s readiness. Most of the
men were new recruits and had little military expertise because “many of
them [were] as yet imperfectly drilled.” Bourke believed that, “these little
night attacks were excellent things,” and they turned “the raw recruit into
a veteran” very rapidly. This campaign was making the troopers into able
and disciplined soldiers.37
The severe weather of late winter made the campaign very
challenging. The temperatures were cold, and the men suffered “without
tents or adequate bedding.”38 The troopers were forced to sleep as best
they could. Some men threw blankets over trees to create a crude shelter
while others made beds out of twigs and grass. General Crook and Col.
Thaddeus H. Stanton were even more resourceful when they used an
abandoned beaver lodge as a place to sleep. Snow started falling on the
morning of March 8, and it continued all day. The heavy snowfall put out
Strahorn, “March 7, 1876,” in Eyewitness, 210-11.
John Gregory Bourke, The Diaries of John Gregory Bourke (Denton, Tex.:
University of North Texas, 2003-2009) 1: 225-6.
38
Strahorn, “March 15, 1876,” in Eyewitness, 213.
36
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camp fires and kept the cooks from fixing a hot meal for the soldiers that
morning. The men had no recourse but to eat “frozen bacon, frozen beans
and frozen coffee.” The ice was so thick on the nearby stream that the men
had to hack through 18 inches of ice to find the water.39
A storm continued to hit the soldiers on March 9, and it snowed
the entire day with “the bitter North wind blowing in our faces.” That
afternoon a thermometer went to minus six degrees Fahrenheit. The
severe weather continued on March 10, and, once again, it snowed all
day. The clouds parted that night and temperatures fell dramatically.
When the men awoke on March 11 the thermometer registered minus
22 degrees Fahrenheit. This was the lowest the mercury in the instrument
could measure, and the soldiers believed that the actual temperature was
as low as minus 39 degrees or perhaps between 40 and 50 degrees below
zero Fahrenheit. Mercifully, the wind stopped that day, and the wind chill
factor did not increase the men’s misery.40
The men were forced to chop off pieces of bacon with axes, and the
few loaves of soft bread that were still in the camp “were frozen solid as
so many rocks.” While the men remarkably “complained but little,” a few
of them commented on their condition. Many of the men in the army
were immigrants from foreign countries, and Americans often found their
accents and antics amusing, especially those of the Irish and Germans.
Pat, the Irishman, and Hans, the German, tried to stay warm by sleeping
under the same blanket. In his misery, Pat observed, “It’s damned cold,
ain’t it?” Hans responded, “Ve has peen damt fools, ain’t we?” He was
perhaps referring to their decision to join the army. Hans had written
on his knapsack at the beginning of the campaign, “Big Horn [River]
or Hell.” After facing the bitter cold, he scratched out those words and
wrote, “Hell Froze Over!”41
The scouts pressed forward trying to locate an Indian camp. Frank
Grouard finally found the tracks of two warriors. He caught up with
them, and he watched their progress for hours. From their activities,

39
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Bourke, Diaries, 232-3.
Bourke, Diaries, 234-5.
Strahorn, “March 15, 1876,” in Eyewitness, 212 and 214-15.
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he believed there was an Indian village within striking distance of the
army. He convinced General Crook that the camp could be surprised by
a forced march through the night. The General took him at his word,
and he ordered his second-in-command, Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, to
take six companies of cavalry to travel rapidly overnight and to attack the
position. The detachment was 370 strong. Perhaps a dozen or more scouts
were with them, meaning that the entire command was nearly 400 men.
For maximum flexibility on the operation, these forces were divided into
three battalions of two companies each.42
Crook stayed with the remaining four companies of cavalry and
two of infantry to protect the slower baggage train. He also remained in
camp at Otter Creek all night meaning that the two columns would be
widely separated.43 Logically, the General should have followed Reynolds
as rapidly as possible to be in a position to offer support if it became
necessary. However, the General chose to advance to the Powder River
by another route planning to rendezvous with Reynolds at the river after
the Colonel’s detachment had the opportunity to strike at the Indian
encampment. Dividing forces in the face of an enemy was a dangerous
tactic, and the fact that Crook was far away from Reynolds meant that the
Colonel lacked the manpower he needed to accomplish his assigned tasks.
Late in the afternoon of March 16, the men in Reynolds’ detachment took
enough rations for two days and left the remainder of the command.44
Grouard, who had accompanied Reynolds, admitted “that the night
was the coldest one I ever experienced in the northern country.”45 The
temperature was very low, and a “wind blowing keenly all the time” made
the wind chill even more severe. The troopers rode until about three a.m.
when they finally came to a halt. The men took their places in line in
a dry ravine “enduring great suffering from the intense frigidity of the
atmosphere.” Some of the soldiers appeared to be on the brink of dying
from the cold. Frequently, when a man was freezing to death, he would
J. W. Vaughn, The Reynolds Campaign on Powder River, (Norman, Okla.: U.
of Oklahoma, 1961), 58-64. Hereafter cited as Powder River.
43
Reynolds, “Official Report,” as cited in Powder River, 207.
44
Vaughn, Powder River, 58-64.
45
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simply fall asleep and never wake up again. Lieutenant Bourke admitted,
“Men in this ravine became drowsy from excessive cold: officers had to
kick and shake them to keep them awake and save them from freezing to
death.”46 Strahorn, a newspaperman, accompanied the expedition, and
he found the cold “almost unbearable.” Some of the men stated that they
would sleep “just for a minute, you know,” but such a slumber was very
dangerous. When their concerned friends shook them awake, these men
would “make all sorts of excuses to be allowed to enter that sleep which,
if undisturbed, would have known no waking.”47

The Battle of Powder River
Grouard scouted ahead and reported that a large village was close by,
and the soldiers pushed forward to strike it before the Indians knew they
were coming. As they approached the camp, the troopers saw the young
warriors walking around the Indian lodges in the valley below them.
Horses and mules grazed on the banks of the Powder River nearby. Even
though the sun was already up, Reynolds had time to get his men in order
for battle because the Indians had not yet detected them.48
The Colonel ordered his units to attack the enemy position from
different directions. Company I, under control of Captain Henry Noyes,
would advance mounted and strike the herd of Indian ponies that were
grazing nearby. At the same time, Company K, under the command of
Captain James Egan, was ordered to charge directly into the encampment
on horseback firing their pistols as they struck. Reynolds ordered two
other companies under Captain Alexander Moore to dismount, advance
on foot, and take up a position as close to the village as possible and
“hold themselves in readiness to promptly and vigorously follow up
the charge.”49 Reynolds explained his plan to Lieutenant Bourke. “I am
sending Noyes’ Battalion to charge the village, because we can give them
Bourke, Diaries, 245-6.
Strahorn, as cited in Eyewitness, 219.
48
For a recent academic study of the battle, see Paul L. Hedren, Powder River:
Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War (Norman, Okla.: U of Oklahoma Press, 2018).
49
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[the Indians] Egan’s pistols.” The commander continued, “when they start
[to run] from the village, Moore will catch them from the top of the ridge
[with his rifles].”50
Many of the soldiers believed, and continued to believe for many
years, that they were striking a Sioux village, and that its warriors were led
by Crazy Horse. Actually, it was a Cheyenne camp under Chief Old Bear,
and this tribe had little to do with the disputes between the U.S. government
and the Sioux. The Cheyenne just happened to be in the wrong place at
the wrong time. The cavalry made no effort to identify whom they were
attacking, and they cared little whose village they would soon attempt to
destroy. The army knew simply that there was an Indian village nearby,
and that was reason enough to burn it and kill its inhabitants if they
could. There were over 100 lodges in the encampment, which included
perhaps 700 people. Among these were about 250 warriors. When the
cavalry struck, the Cheyenne were surprised and badly outnumbered, but
they soon gave a good account of themselves.51
Lieutenant John Bourke was proud of the skillful deployment of the
troops. When Captain Egan gave the orders for the soldiers to form lines for
battle, “the little company of 47 men formed a beautiful line in less time than
it takes to narrate the movement.” Egan told his men to keep their horses at a
walk until they were spotted by the enemy. They were then “to charge at a slow
trot, . . . and upon approaching closely to fire our pistols and storm the village.”
Bourke saw that “an Indian boy, herding his ponies, was standing within
ten feet of me.” The Lieutenant leveled his revolver at the child, perhaps
contemplating killing the boy so the child could not alarm the village of the
army’s approach. But Captain Egan intervened and told Bourke, “let him
alone, John.” The boy retained his composure “maintaining silence until we
had passed and then shouting the war-whoop to alarm the village.”52
Hunters from the Cheyenne village had seen the troopers camped at
Otter Creek, and the warriors rode back to the village as fast as possible.
Bourke, Diaries, 249.
Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877: The Military View,
Jerome A. Greene, ed. (Norman: U. of Oklahoma, 1993), 3. Hereafter cited as Military View. The men attacking the village believed that it included 100 lodges or more.
52
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Some of their ponies fell from exhaustion, and their riders were forced
to reach the encampment on foot. Many young men went out that night
to watch for the soldiers including ten with specific orders from the
council of old men. The Indians in the village slept securely that night
believing that the sentinels would warn them if the troopers approached,
but the young men on lookout failed to see the soldiers in time to give an
adequate warning. That morning an old man went to the top of a hill to
pray when he saw the cavalry. He started shouting, “The soldiers are right
here! The soldiers are right here!” When the army attacked, many of the
Indians panicked. “Women screamed. Children cried for their mothers.
Old people tottered and hobbled away to get out of reach of the bullets
singing among the lodges. Braves seized whatever weapons they had and
tried to meet the attack.”53 The battle had begun.
The newspaperman, Robert Strahorn, accompanied Company K
when it attacked. He wrote that the men were ordered to draw their
revolvers, place their “steeds to the full gallop, dash into the village with
as much force and with as terrific yells as possible; and when once among
the savages, to empty our six-shooters ‘where they would do the most
good.’”
When the men were less than 200 yards from the nearest lodge, the
order was given, “Charge, my boys!” The men spurred their horses, and
the troopers attacked, “yelling like so many demons.” The Cheyenne ran
out of their tepees and scattered as fast as they could. The soldiers “fired
right and left at their retreating forms.” The troopers’ mounts seemed to
be invigorated by the din of battle, and “they fairly flew over the ground.”
The Indians were only briefly confused, and they began to resist effectively.
“A majority of the Redskins snatched their arms as they ran, dropped as
though shot, behind a log or stump, in the tall grass, or took temporary
refuge in the thickets of willow and plum [trees].” The warriors began
firing back and inflicting casualties on the attackers. The cavalrymen were
riding gray horses, and the color of the animals made them more visible
to the defenders, so the Indians found them to be good targets. Five of the

Wooden Leg, A Warrior who fought Custer, Interpreted by Thomas B. Marquis
(Lincoln. Neb.: University of Nebraska, 2003), 164-5.
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Frank Grouard.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

animals were wounded, including the horse rode by Captain Egan, and
two were killed.54
According to Frank Grouard, one of these horses was killed in a
heroic fashion. During the attack, the hospital steward, Will Bryan, was
54

Strahorn, as cited in Eyewitness, 221.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol57/iss3/5

28

et al.: Full Issue

November 2021 SAHS Review

26

Robert E Strahorn ca. 1900.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

riding next to Captain Egan. When the men rode among the lodges, an
Indian ran out of one of them and aimed his weapon at the Captain.
Bryan could see that Egan could be killed in an instant, and he ran his
horse forward to protect the Captain. The Indian fired, and the bullet
went straight into the head of the mount killing the animal instantly.
Bryan was then on foot, and he attempted to run down the Indian. The
soldier ran after him chasing him past the groups of lodges. Even though
the steward was known as a good runner, he failed to catch the warrior.55

55
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Robert Strahorn gave a less dramatic and a less heroic account of the
incident. He wrote that Bryan saw a young warrior firing revolvers at him
from behind a tree stump. The steward ducked behind his horse’s head
to avoid being hit, “and the poor animal received the bullet in his brain.”
According to this account, the animal died saving Bryan’s life not Egan’s.56
During the charge into the village, a bullet went through a soldier’s
cap. The ball just grazed the man’s head, but he and a couple of other
men dashed forward “to wreak their vengeance on the Redskin who had
fired.” When they rushed into a lodge, they were very surprised to see
three or four women armed with revolvers, “in the act of slipping through
the opposite side of the wigwam by way of a hole they had just carved
with butcher knives.” Strahorn was clearly impressed with the courage
and resourcefulness of his adversaries, and he admitted, “These Indians
may be cowardly, but they have a queer way of showing it.”57
The Indians “threw themselves behind the brush . . . [and] opened
upon us in a lively fire.” The soldiers were still wielding their pistols. The
troopers kept pressing forward, and they forced the warriors to abandon
“the first line of trees,” and take “refuge farther to the rear.” While
Lieutenant Bourke stated the men had “behaved very gallantly” in the
“three or four minutes this little affair lasted,” they had taken casualties.
Three men were wounded, including John Droege. One was shot in the
lungs, another had been struck in the elbow, and yet another was hit
in the collar bone. Private George Schneider, “a very brave soldier,” was
shot through the neck and soon died. There were also many close misses.
Bourke’s “bridle rein was cut in two by a bullet and a number of men were
shot through their clothing.”58
When Wooden Leg ran out of his lodge, he grabbed what weapons
he could. He had an old muzzle-loading rifle, but he had no bullets for it.
He also owned an old six-shooter pistol, but he had recently loaned it to
Star, a cousin, who gave him a bow and some arrows in return. Wooden
Leg shot the arrows at the soldiers, but these antiquated weapons were
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ineffective. Fortunately, he got to the horse herd in time to grab an animal,
and the warrior tried to return to the village where he met people trying to
escape. “Women were struggling along with packs of precious belongings.
Some were dragging or carrying their children. All were shrieking with
fright.” He put a young girl and a small boy on his mount and brought
them to safety, but his day’s work was not done. “Then I went back to help
in the fight.”59
The Indians kept up a heavy fire by “pouring bullets from behind every
convenient cover in the shape of rocks, trees, thickets, etc.” The soldiers
had lost the momentum they had used in the charge on the village, and
their pistols had insufficient range to threaten the warriors. The troopers
were ordered to dismount, to give their horses to every fourth man to hold
them, and to continue the battle by the use of their carbines, which were
short rifles. The situation became critical as the Cheyenne occupied more
defensible positions than did the cavalry. Captain Moore was supposed
to take an advantageous position overlooking the village that potentially
could have trapped the Indians, but his troopers were detained and the
flank of Company K was exposed. Strahorn feared the warriors “must
have thought it an easy matter to annihilate us in a very short course of
events.” Captain Egan clearly thought that aggressive action could have
kept his adversaries at a distance and regained the initiative for the cavalry,
so he “soon ordered a charge through the brush on foot.” Even though
the Indians continued to fight, they were pushed back by this unexpected
advance. During the charge, a small detachment of “half a dozen men”
came down the hill to aid the hard-pressed soldiers. Soon after, Company
M and E finally arrived, and the cavalry was then in complete control of
the village.60
Captain Noyes brought up Company I and swung around Egan’s
command on the right to strike at the Indian horse herd, which his men
easily captured. There were about 700 to 800 ponies, which “did not
include more than half the number seen by us.” But the loss of these
animals was a severe blow to the Indians’ ability to fight and to move.
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Joseph J. Reynolds
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The warriors were still on the high ground outside the village, and they
continued to fire at the troopers. Reynolds believed that he had too few
soldiers to drive his adversaries away completely, so he ordered his men
to form a skirmish line to keep the warriors at a distance. He stated, “The
Indians fled from the village and assumed positions behind rocks, trees,
etc., and opened fire upon our line making it necessary that our position
just taken should be strongly held by our troops to prevent the Indians
from recapturing the village.”61
61
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Location of Powder River Battle.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

Reynolds then ordered the complete destruction of the village. He
was hampered in this effort because most of his men were deployed in the
line of battle, so Reynolds assigned only Company E under Lieutenant
John Johnson with the task. Many of the materials to be destroyed
were works of art. Bourke said that there were buffalo robes and skins
of beavers and bears, and “many [were] of extra-fine quality.” Some of
the robes “were wondrously embroidered with porcupine quills, paint
and trimmings.” Much of the leather was also “embroidered with beadwork.” The Indians had many belongings. “In each lodge, knives and
forks, spoons, tin-cups, platters, mess-pans, frying-pans, pots and kettles
of all kinds, axes, hatchets, hunting knives, water-kegs, blankets, pillows
and every imaginable kind of truck [small miscellaneous items] was seen
in profusion.” The soldiers also found tons of venison and dried buffalo
meat. The troopers set the lodges on fire, and the men heard the pop and
puff of ammunition and powder exploding in the flames.62
62
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The lodges did not burn as rapidly as was expected because of “the
dampness of the material lodge skin and cloth [and the] danger from
powder explosions in the lodges,” which likely kept the men from being
more thorough in their work.63
Reynolds later came under severe criticism from Bourke and others
for destroying much of what the army badly needed. “General Reynolds
ordered everything destroyed and with a command undergoing every
hardship, suffering from intense cold and hunger. Tons of first-class meat
and provisions were destroyed and many things of positive necessity to
the men [were] wantonly burned up.”64 Indeed many of the men were
more interested in plundering the village for items they needed than in
burning the camp. Reynolds was frustrated by the men trying to retrieve
what they badly needed because he thought this effort wasted time and
kept the troopers from following their orders as rapidly as he desired. “I
found great difficulty in preventing the men from pilfering. They delayed
the firing of the lodges to bring out robes and meat. I required them to
throw these things down where they were and ordered the destruction of
the village be promptly made.”65
The guides found an elderly woman in one of the lodges laying on
a couch, and the men interviewed her. Apparently, she cleverly told them
what they wanted to hear. According to the old lady, the main chief of the
encampment belonged to Crazy Horse, and most of the Indians in the
village were Sioux.66 The village was clearly Cheyenne, and Crazy Horse
was far away at the time, so this was false information, but the guides
believed it anyway. Perhaps in consideration of her age, and the fact she
told them useful lies, the men did not molest her or destroy her lodge.
When the Indians retook the village after the battle, they found only
one lodge still standing. They went inside to find the “old blind woman”
entirely unharmed. The warriors talked about this “all agreeing that the
act showed the soldiers had good hearts.”67
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John Gregory Bourke.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The battle with the Cheyenne continued, but the army probably
inflicted few casualties on the warriors. No one in the army knew how many
Indians had been killed as Lieutenant Bourke admitted, “We captured no
bodies [but] we had excellent reasons for believing we had killed and
wounded many in the enemy’s ranks.”68 This was little more than wishful
thinking, and Wooden Leg reported that only, “One Cheyenne was killed
by the soldiers. Another had his forearm badly shattered. Braided Locks . .
. had the skin of one cheek furrowed by a bullet.” Most of the Indians fired
on the soldiers at a distance and did little damage, but Two Moons, Bear
68
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Walks on a Ridge, and Wooden Leg “centered an attack upon one certain
soldier.” Two Moons wielded a repeating rifle. He “passed his hands up and
down the barrel, not touching it, while making medicine.” He finally said,
“My medicine is good; watch me kill that soldier.” He shot, but he missed
his target. Then Bear Walks on a Ridge aimed and fired his muzzle-loading
rifle. Apparently, the bullet hit the trooper in the back of the head. The
warriors then “rushed upon the man and beat him to death.”69 The trooper
they had killed was probably Private Michael McCannon, whose body was
never found, but Wooden Leg’s account of the man’s demise also has some
similarities to the death of Private Lorenzo Ayers.
Private Jeremiah Murphy reported that the Indians shot Private
Ayers through the hand and the leg before he died. The wounded man’s
thigh bone was broken, so he was unable to walk. Murphy and the
blacksmith, Albert Glavinski, stayed with Ayers until the Indians came
close, and Murphy had decided to flee. But the wounded man pleaded
to his friend in a heart-rending voice, “Oh Murphy; for Mercy’s sake, do
not leave me in their hands.” Murphy bravely returned and “lifted the
groaning man to his shoulders and tried to make his way through the
advancing savages, who poured a rain of bullets at him.” Ayers was shot
yet again, and “Murphy’s carbine stock [was] smashed by a rifle-ball.”
Murphy drew his revolver, and he fired until it was empty. He then had
no choice but abandon his friend and run for his life. “His uniform was
pierced by several bullets, but the brave man escaped unscathed.” Murphy
fled into some bushes for cover. When he noticed that the warriors had
stopped firing at him, he looked back, and he “saw them [the warriors]
circling around the wounded man—ten or fifteen of them.” The Indians
killed Ayers, and Murphy saw him scalped. For his courage, Murphy was
later awarded the Medal of Honor, the highest commendation given to
United States military personnel for bravery in combat.70
Four soldiers were killed in battle that day including Private Peter
Dowdy, who “was shot through the head and instantly killed.” Six men
Wooden Leg, A Warrior 167.
Murphy as cited in Powder River, 118 and Walter F. Beyer, Deeds of Valor from
the Records of the Archives of the United States Government: How American Heroes won
the Congressional Medal of Honor 2 vols. (Detroit, Mich.: Perrien, 1901-2), 2: 206-7.
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were also wounded. The troopers retrieved two of the bodies of the fallen,
George Schneider and Peter Dowdy. Reynolds reported that there was no
means of taking the bodies with the army or burying them. This was a weak
excuse because the soldiers certainly could have tied the corpses onto horses
and carried the them away, but the army left them. The bodies of the two
other fatalities, Michael McCannon and Lorenzo Ayers, were left with the
Indians and never retrieved. The wounded men who could not ride were
placed on travois which were two poles connected by hides or blankets upon
which the wounded men could lay. Horses then dragged the devices.71
The battle continued for five hours while Reynolds became
increasingly concerned about his weak position, the aggressiveness of his
adversaries, and the accuracy of their marksmanship. “There was danger
that the Indians now becoming bolder and stronger by creeping among
the logs, trees, sage brush, rocks, and willows which were found from
one end of our line to the other, would pick off our men from concealed
positions and where our return fire would not be as effective as theirs.”72
Clearly, the battle was going badly for the army. The men had fired
more than 60 rounds of ammunition each and had still been unable to
keep their adversaries away. Lieutenant Johnson reported that the position
occupied by Captain Moore’s two companies was becoming increasingly
threatened, and the command fell back. When they did so, the Indians
followed them and “boldly appeared and danced on the sage brush bench
which he had occupied.” Moore’s men were in a position that was soon
becoming untenable because “our line received the Indians fire from
the right, front and left.” Twice Johnson came to Reynolds stating that
the threatened troopers must have reinforcements or fall back yet again.
Initially, the Colonel seemed to misunderstand the urgency of the message
and disagreed with the report stating, “that isn’t so” or “can’t be so.” Finally,
Reynolds saw the gravity of the situation. He realized that after the army
had destroyed the village, little more could be accomplished by holding
the encampment, and the Colonel ordered his hard-pressed command
to withdraw from the village. The warriors were quick to reoccupy the
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encampment. When the army was leaving the village from one side, the
Indians was entering it on the other.73
The soldiers marched up the Powder River for 20 miles to the mouth
of Lodge Pole Creek where they were supposed to meet General Crook’s
command. Bourke stated that the men “were very uncomfortable from
want of adequate clothing.” They were also out of food. “[We] have no
rations, not even for our poor wounded men.” A few of the officers had
some crackers in their saddle bags, and a few soldiers only had a small
piece or two buffalo meat. This made a “miserable apology for supper.”
Once the meat was cooked in some ashes, it was divided among five or
six troopers “each getting a mouthful only.” Many of the men were also
suffering from the effects of the cold, and there were “a great number of
cases of frosted and frozen feet, noses and fingers” as well. Lieutenant
Bourke suffered from “frozen toes,” and the doctors painted them with
Iodine as a treatment.74
Colonel Reynolds was concerned about the his ability to control
the herd of Indian ponies he had captured. They were far too valuable
to abandon to his adversaries, but there was no best option of what to
do with them. He considered shooting the animals, but he “feared that
[he] might require the ammunition for other purposes,” meaning that he
was concerned that the warriors would again attack his command. The
Colonel worried that the use of hundreds of bullets to kill the horses
potentially left him at a disadvantage. Many of his men had fired more
than 60 rounds that day, and the troopers probably had insufficient
ammunition left to engage the Indians again in a lengthy battle.75
Reynolds hoped that his problems would be solved when they met
General Crook at the mouth of Lodge Pole Creek, but the Colonel was
disappointed when he arrived at the location at sundown to find that the
General had not yet arrived. Crook was supposed to be waiting with “pack
trains and fresh troops to guard our stock and give us relief,” but Reynold’s
men would have to fend for themselves that night. The General and his
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command could have been on hand, but Crook had advanced slowly that
day. Early in the morning, it took his men four hours to ride ten miles.
When the command was within a half mile of the Powder River, Crook
thought an Indian village might be nearby, and he fell back a mile and a
half, so the Indians would not see him. This tardiness did nothing to help
Reynolds, and his men and their horses were completely exhausted as the
Colonel explained, “We had marched 54 miles and fought four hours
during the last 26 hours, had no sleep during the previous night, and in
fact no rest during the previous 36 hours, and [we had] marched . . . 73
miles from the camp on the Tongue River.”76
That night too few guards were placed over the captured horse herd,
and the exhausted troopers, who had gone two days without sleep, were
in no position to watch the animals carefully. Wooden Leg and other
warriors followed the soldiers and approached their camp at night. “We
crept toward the herd.” One of the men would whisper, “I see my horse.”
Then another man said, “There is mine.” Most of the warriors could
not see their animals, so they took any horse that was nearby. Wooden
Leg was pleased, “I got my own favorite animal.” After retrieving many
Indian ponies, the men tried to take some of the soldiers’ mounts, but the
troopers shot at them, and the warriors concentrated on taking their own
animals. The horses helped the Indians a great deal because they “let the
women and some of the old people ride.”77
By morning the rest of the Indian ponies had strayed far enough
from the camp that a small group of Indians were able to retrieve them.
When the animals were still in view, going over a ridge only three or four
miles away, Reynolds “to the surprise of all” refused to make any attempt
to recapture them. While the army still had about 100 Indian ponies,
which meant that most of the horses were lost, some of the men severely
criticized this decision. “Great dissatisfaction now arose among all, several
of the officers venting their ill-feelings in splenetic [i.e. bitter] criticism,
and openly charging Reynolds with incapacity.”78 The Colonel later
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defended his decision not to pursue the horses, “I deemed it inadvisable in
the condition of our horses to attempt a long and doubtful chase after the
ponies.” He further argued that he must keep his mounts from breaking
down because they would be needed in the summer months for additional
campaigning.79 This excuse had little merit because the army could easily
buy more horses for future operations.
Some of Reynolds’ men also bitterly criticized his leadership in the
battle. Strahorn stated that abandoning the bodies of two men to the
Indians was “utterly inexcusable.”80 Lieutenant Bourke was critical of
almost every aspect of the Colonel’s leadership. Bourke wrote that leaving
the bodies of the dead were “errors” that showed “Reynolds’ imbecility.”
The Lieutenant further sated that the refusal of his leader to allow his
men to take buffalo robes and food from the Indian camp showed “bad
management.” Only grudgingly did Bourke admit that Reynolds was
“very cool under fire, discharging duties, at least as far as he understood
them, efficiently and cooly.”81
The attack on the village was costly to its inhabitants, and Wooden
Leg stated that, “the Cheyennes were rendered very poor.” The warrior
had little left but the clothes on his back, and everything else was gone.
The victims of the attack trudged to the north and east, and they had
to sleep in the open for three nights. They were hungry because only
a small number of women had “little chunks of dry meat in the small
packs.” Few of them had buffalo robes to protect them from the cold, and
“there was hard freezing at night and there was mud and water by day.”
On the fourth day, they arrived at the camp of the Ogallala Sioux who
“received us hospitably, as we knew they would.” Many of the Indians
called to their friends, “Cheyennes, come and eat here,” and the refugees
were soon fed, housed, and clothed. The main leader of the Sioux was
the famous warrior Chief Crazy Horse. Soon the Cheyenne and various
groups of Sioux met and decided that they should join their forces to
resist the army.82
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Crook’s campaign and irresponsible attack on the village had done
little to hurt the military abilities of the Indians but had done much
to expand the war. The warriors had suffered few casualties, and they
were soon able to replenish their losses of supplies and lodges. Before
this unprovoked attack, the Northern Cheyenne had little interest in the
issues that brought the Sioux to war. After the battle of Powder River,
the Cheyenne became allies of the Sioux, and they would participate in
many of the campaigns during the rest of the year. Additionally, the army
thought they had attacked the village of Crazy Horse and damaged the
ability of the Sioux to fight. But their error in striking the Cheyenne
village had the opposite effect, because the army had given the famous war
chief and many of the his Sioux allies additional manpower to use against
the soldiers.

Retreat and Accusations
General Crook’s command finally met with Colonel Reynolds’
column of troopers at noon on March 18, 1876, to the great relief of the
Colonel’s men. The General “was much pleased to learn of our having
encountered the Sioux and taken their village.” A few Indians were still
following the soldiers perhaps hoping to seize some of the ponies still held
by the cavalry. One warrior, “wearing a war bonnet” made the mistake
of coming within range of the General’s rifle. Known as an excellent
marksman, Crook took aim and apparently hit the man who fell from
his saddle. His comrades took the wounded man away, but the troopers
captured the man’s horse, saddle, buffalo robe, blanket, and war bonnet.83
The warriors followed the army and occasionally took shots into the
soldiers’ camp fires. The Indians were probably looking for an opportunity
to retrieve the remaining horses. Crook feared that the warriors would
continue to cause trouble as long as the cavalry still had some of their
mounts, so he ordered the animals killed. The troopers shot some of the
horses, but they also slit some of their throats as well. When the animals
were in their death pain, they made “a dismal trumpeting,” and the
83
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Indians knew what the sound meant. “With one yell of defiance and a
parting volley, they left us alone for the rest of the night.” The soldiers
were so hungry that they cut large chunks of meat from the dead ponies,
which they cooked in the ashes of their campfires. Even though some of
the men had misgivings about eating horse flesh, they were desperate for
food, and they found the meat “sweet and nourishing.”84
The hungry and fatigued men rode for days until they reached Fort
Reno on March 21. After resting there for a couple of days, the command
resumed its march. Fortunately, the weather was getting warmer. While
the men still faced heavy snow, there was also much rain, and the soldiers
had to deal with sticky mud. During this march, 58 horses and 32 mules
were either shot or abandoned because they could no longer walk. The
men also continued to suffer from fatigue and hunger. “First we were put
on half rations and then on quarter rations and were very fortunate to
get back . . . before running out of rations entirely.”85 The soldiers arrived
back at Fort Fetterman on March 25, 1876. The campaign was over, but
the recriminations were just about to begin.
Crook was clearly pleased with the outcome of the campaign during
the return journey, and he sent two telegrams to his superiors from Fort Reno
on March 22 and 23 bragging about the success in the battle. He boasted
that Reynolds had “attacked and destroyed” the Indian encampment.
The General further stated with clear exaggeration, “We succeeded in
breaking up Crazy Horse’s band . . . killing more than 100 Indians and
burning their village on the Little Powder River. An immense quantity of
ammunition, arms and dried meats were stored in their lodges, all of which
we destroyed.”86 His statement that “we succeeded” and “we destroyed”
were efforts for Crook to share in Reynolds’ victory. But two days after
he sent the second telegram, the General arrived at Fort Fetterman and
immediately charged Colonel Reynolds with dereliction of duty. Much
had changed since Crook had praised the Colonel’s efforts, and the victory
at the Battle of Powder River was then called a failure.
John Gregory Bourke, On the Border with Crook (Chicago: Rio Grande,
1962), 281. Hereafter cited as Bourke, Crook.
85
Private Phineas S. Towne as cited in Powder River, 158.
86
Crook as cited in Powder River, 180.
84

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol57/iss3/5

42

et al.: Full Issue

November 2021 SAHS Review

40

The tired, cold, and hungry soldiers had complained for days about their
discomfort on the campaign, and they found much to blame in the conduct
of Reynolds, many of their officers, and anyone else on the expedition.
Lieutenant Morton probably provoked the recriminations when he had
taken out some of his misery by aiming “ill-judged criticisms” toward Robert
Strahorn, the correspondent for the Daily Rocky Mountain News. Strahorn
had conducted himself admirably in the battle and had fought bravely with
Lieutenant Bourke’s men in the village, and the newspaperman refused to
take Morton’s unfair criticism and threatened to retaliate and “publish the
truth” of the campaign by printing its failures. Bourke stated that Crook
had “no other remedy left but to probe the matter to the quick by a General
Court Martial.”87 The General decided to defray any possible criticisms that
could be leveled against him by finding someone else to blame.
Colonel Reynolds later claimed that Crook stated that he would drop
the charges against him if the Colonel would file charges against Captain
Noyes and Captain Moore. Dutifully, Reynolds brought an accusation
against Noyes stating that he had neglected his duty by halting his men
for lunch when they were so badly needed in the fight for the village.
While the court found Noyes guilty, Crook stated that the Captain had
only “committed an error in judgment,” and he was immediately released
from arrest.88 This trial was practically a farce probably staged to make
it appear that the army was dealing with its problems, but the trial of
Reynolds had a much more serious purpose.
This court martial was held in January 1877, several months after
the summer and fall campaigns against the Sioux had been concluded. The
Battle of Powder River had long been overshadowed by General Crook’s
further campaigns that resulted in the battles of the Rosebud in June 1876
and Slim Buttes in September 1876. The conduct at Powder River was
largely forgotten by then, and the court martial of Colonel Reynolds was
little more than Crook’s vindictiveness.
Reynolds was charged with disobedience to orders, mismanaging
the battle, leaving the dead and wounded on the battlefield, and
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allowing the Indian ponies to be recaptured. The General testified
that he had given verbal orders to Reynolds, which the subordinate
did not follow. The Colonel argued that he followed the instructions
given to him. Reynolds further defended himself by saying that Crook
was pleased with the campaign until the threat that criticisms might
appear in the newspapers. The Colonel testified that the General even
“congratulated” him and his men for their success in battle. Reynolds
further criticized Crook’s decisions, “There was no reason whatsoever
for dividing the command” which left the Colonel with too few men to
accomplish all their tasks. Reynolds claimed he had done his best under
the circumstances.89
The Colonel had little chance for real justice in a court convened
to condemn him and to vindicate the General, and Reynolds was found
guilty on all charges. His punishment was to be suspended from service
for one year without pay. The Colonel realized that his military career
was over, and he soon retired from the army. With the exception of
abandoning his dead on the battlefield, Reynolds had managed the battle
competently. Perhaps he made a number of mistakes, but each decision
seemed logical considering his insufficient manpower and his exhausted
troops. He might have done as well as anyone else in the same situation,
and a prominent historian of the Indian campaigns has called the decision
of the court, “cruelly unjust.”90
The Battle of Powder River should be placed in context of other
similar campaigns against the Indians. At the battles of the Washita in
November 1868, Slim Buttes in September 1876, and Dull Knife’s village
on the Red Fork in November 1876, the army fought similar engagements.
In each case, the soldiers took an Indian village and burned it, but the
army later withdrew when faced with determined counter attacks by
Indian warriors. But these battle were viewed as great accomplishments.91
While these outcomes were almost identical to that at Powder River, this
Reynolds as cited in Powder River, 176.
Vaughn, Powder River, 183.
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engagement was considered
a failure because General
Crook wanted to defray any
criticism by ruining the career
of a competent subordinate.
Perhaps the most important
aspect of the campaign that
culminated in the Battle
of Powder River was what
it showed about Crook’s
character and quality of
leadership. The General clearly
underestimated the fighting
ability of his adversaries at
Powder River, and he would
do so again at the Battle of the
Rosebud.
To a certain extent,
John F. Finerty.
Crook was the victim of
Courtesy:
Wikimedia Commons.
his own propaganda. In
condemning Reynolds for his
actions at Powder River, the General had declared that the campaign and
battle were failures. Crook now needed a victory to salvage his reputation
and that of his command.

The Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition
The army had to assemble at Fort Fetterman to prepare
for the next campaign against the Indians. One of the prominent
eyewitnesses to the campaign was the newspaperman, John F. Finerty,
who became a dear friend of Captain Sutorius. The Swiss “with whom
I had arranged to mess [eat together] sent me work on the [May]
14 th that the command was under orders, and that I had better take
up my residence at Fort Russell during the night” in preparation for
the campaign. The reporter praised the Swiss highly and said that
“Captain Sutorius was the soul of hospitality.” In short order, “Captain
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021
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Sutorius welcomed us warmly, and explained he had no lieutenant,
one being on sick leave and the other detailed for other duty.” 92
At one point near mid May, Finerty was taking a long nap at meal
time, “Supper was being served in Captain Sutorius’ tent before I thought
of waking up, and it took a good, honest poke in the ribs from the hardy
Captain to recall me from the land of my dreams.” Despite his long
nap the day before, the newspaper reporter “slept soundly throughout
the night” but rain was falling the next morning. “An orderly came with
the compliments of the commanding officer, to instruct the Captain
[Sutorius] not to strike tents, as, if the rain did not cease before 8 o’clock,
the battalion would remain in camp, as the wagons could not be moved
in the dense mud.” The rain delay gave the men an opportunity to rest
because they were “exceedingly fatigued.”93
The attempts to deal crippling blows on the Sioux in the early
spring of 1876 had been failures. When the weather improved, the army
took the field again. General John Gibbon left Fort Ellis with 450 men
to march southeast. General Alfred Terry advanced from Fort Abraham
Lincoln with 950 men; and he was joined by George Armstrong Custer
with 640 men in the Seventh Cavalry. General Crook’s command had
received reinforcements, and it was then a formidable force comprised of
ten companies from the 3rd Cavalry, five companies from the 2nd Cavalry,
two companies from the 4th Infantry regiment, and three companies from
the 9th Infantry regiment. This force numbered 1,002 men and 47 officers.
They marched from Fort Fetterman on May 29, 1876.94
The advance was much easier than the trying campaign two months
earlier. Initially, the biggest challenge for the men had been fording
streams, but tragedy struck on May 30 when a man, Private Francis
Tierney, accidentally shot himself while chopping wood. He died on
June 7, and the troopers were forced to bury the first casualty of the
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expedition.95 The question on so many minds was, “Where are the Sioux?”
“This interrogation was addressed by Captain Sutorius to Captain Wells
at a bivouac fire of the Third Cavalry.” The Swiss was soon to answer his
own question. On the night of June 8 at about 11 o’clock in the evening,
Finerty was awakened “by the loud and persistent howling of what
seemed to be a band of coyotes, animals that the Indians often imitate
when approaching a camp.” The sound soon got more menacing. “Soon
afterwards a deep voice was heard shouting down by the river to the men
encamped there.” It remained to the Swiss to realize the nature of the
voice. “Captain Sutorius, who was also aroused, said: ‘That sounds like
the voice of an Indian.”96 He was soon shown to be correct.
Lieutenant Bourke thought the campaign was quite dull, and he
was pleased when “the monotony of camp life was agreeably broken by
an attack upon our lines made in a most energetic manner by the Sioux
and Cheyennes” on June 9. The army heard reports that Crazy Horse had
threatened that he would attack any soldiers who crossed the Tongue River.
When the column reached that stream, the troopers were extra vigilant, and
they placed a line of men at the top of the nearby hills to warn of any enemy
advance. These sentinels soon saw Indians, and the troopers started to ride
“their horses around in a circle, a warning that they had seen something
dangerous.” The Indians advanced in good order, and they forced the
soldiers in forward positions to withdraw. The warriors soon hid among the
rocks from which they began to fire on the army camp. Fortunately for the
troopers, the Indians’ shots inflicted few casualties. The warriors directed
much of their fire on the tents that were unoccupied at that time, but “bullets
ripped through the canvas, split the ridge poles, smashed the pipes of the . . .
stoves, and imbedded themselves in the tail boards of the wagons.” Only two
troopers were slightly wounded by glancing bullets.97
Even though the shots from the warriors did little serious damage,
General Crook had to remove this threat. He ordered his men to mount
and advance on the Indian positions. In a fine show of discipline, the
command mounted and charged across the Tongue River. They soon saw
95
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Little Hawk.
Courtesy:
Wikimedia
Commons.

their “assailants scampering like deer.” The cavalry “rushed forward with
a yell,” and their adversaries fired a few more shots at them before they
retreated into the hills.98 The situation was potentially serious because the
Indians might return in larger numbers, but Lieutenant Bourke seemed
little concerned, and he thought that such attacks did the army much
good in the same way when they were marching to the Powder River three
months earlier. “It is to be hoped the Indians may make attacks of this
kind every night.” He explained that “no greater advantage can accrue
to young troops than to keep them constantly under fire.” In reacting to
this threat, the new men in the army would learn their tasks well, become
veterans, and learn “the importance of implicit obedience to authority.”
Also, the officers would also become more efficient in their duties.99
Little Hawk described an attack on the cavalry when the army was
near the Tongue River. Some of the warriors decided to strike at night
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because they thought they could stampede the cavalry’s horses. The
Indians crept close to the army camp and charged. To their surprise, the
soldiers appeared to be waiting for them. They “must have been sitting
up with guns in their hands for a rain of bullets” met the attackers. The
warriors fired for a while, but there were no casualties, as far as Little
Hawk knew, on either side. The attackers then drew off and returned to
their camp.100
As Crook’s command improved in competency, it also increased in
size. The Crow Indians had long hated the Sioux and Cheyenne, and they
were eager to assist the army in fighting their old enemies. On June 14,
1876, Crow warriors arrived in camp. These warriors impressed Lt. Bourke
who said that they would be very helpful to the command because they
could “follow the trails of the hostile Sioux and discover their villages.”
This was a needed skill which the soldiers did not have. In addition, the
Crows would also spare the soldiers the tiresome duty of scouting in
advance of the cavalry column. Also, these warriors were well armed with
breech-loading rifles, many of which were the same weapons used by the
army. In addition, 86 Shoshone warriors soon arrived. They also shared a
hatred for the Sioux and wanted to fight against their old adversaries.101
Including the infantry, the cavalry, and the Indian allies, Crook’s column
numbered at least 1,325 men, which was indeed a formidable force.102
Frank Grouard and many of the scouts also arrived on June 14,
and many of the troopers celebrated their return. Crook and his men
continued to gain confidence, and they believed they could deal with any
threat from their adversaries. As Lt. Bourke observed, “No one now had
doubts we shall be victorious. . . . [and] It was evident the General meant
business.”103 Finerty also noted, “Crook was bristling for a fight.”104 The
General was soon to get the battle he wanted.
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Crow Scouts at the Little Bighorn in 1913.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The Crow Indians told Crook that they believed that Crazy Horse’s
camp was located farther down the Tongue River, or on one of its small
tributaries. Most importantly they, “were quite positive we should be
able to surprise it” by a forced march. Crook believed this to be a good
opportunity, and he “considered it worthwhile to make the attempt.” He
resolved to mount a decisive attack by breaking away from his slow supply
train and hitting the camp before the Indians knew of his approach.105 He
ordered his men to be ready to march on the morning of June 16. The
General stated that each man would carry food for four days in his saddle
bags. “No tents were taken, and neither wagons or ambulances. . . . Many
officers as well as the soldiers [took] a good sized piece of dried elk meat,
some hard bread, sugar, coffee, and at least 100 rounds of ammunition.”106
Crook wanted to move as rapidly as possible, but he also wanted to
bring as many soldiers as he could with him. His infantry could certainly
105
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bring greater numbers and firepower to bear in any engagement, but they
had to be present to have any impact on a battle. These men on foot,
often called “Walk-a-heaps” by the Indians, frequently walked impressive
distances, but they were incapable of keeping up with the cavalry on rapid
marches. Crook’s solution was to place 175 foot soldiers on mules, the
only mounts available. The animals were taken from the supply train. The
mules had a reputation for being headstrong, and they were not used to
being ridden. Similarly, many of the infantrymen had no experience or
skill on horseback.
On June 15, these men tried to learn to ride to the great amusement
of the experienced horsemen. Frank Grouard claimed, “I never saw so
much fun in all my life. The valley for a mile in every direction was
filled with bucking mules, frightened infantrymen, broken saddles and
applauding spectators.” He further saw, “some of the most ludicrous
mishaps imaginable.”107 Lt. Bourke also enjoyed the scene, “Amusing
incidents there were in plenty and many scenes of grand and lofty
tumbling occurred when the improvised dragoons attempted for the first
time to mount their charges.” The mules clearly gave a good account of
themselves in resisting the foot soldiers, but the infantrymen were finally
able to master their mounts.108
Finerty found much to praise in the young men who soon marched
into battle. They were “careless, courageous and eminently light hearted,”
and the “majority were of either Irish or German birth or parentage.” The
command was “a fine organization” in which four-fifths of the officers had
graduated from West Point, the United States Army military academy, and
were professional and able leaders. The men arose early on the morning of
June 16. Every man was mounted, and the “splendid” column began its
march to the northwest.109
While Finerty laughed at the infantrymen trying to learn to ride their
mules as had everyone else, he still had much to learn about taking proper
care of his equipment and weapons. After a brief rest, Finerty got back on
his horse, and the muzzle of his rifle accidentally struck the hammer of
107
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his revolver. The hammer was resting on the primer in the cartridge, and
the sudden jolt discharged the weapon. The shock of “explosion” made
the newspaperman think that someone had “hit me a vigorous blow with
a stick on the right rear of my pantaloons,” and his horse recoiled from
the shock of the bullet. The ball blew off the back of the saddle but did no
further damage. A trooper rode to Finerty and assured him, “You were not
made to be killed by bullets, or that would have fixed you.” The reporter
was so shaken that he could not respond clearly when Captain Guy Henry
asked him “Is the bullet in your person?” In confusion Finerty stated, “I
don’t know.” The officer was quite amused by a man who could not tell if
he had been shot and said, “Then by Jove it is about time you found out.”
He rode away laughing.110
Crook had wanted to approach the Sioux camp and strike it before
his adversaries had time to react, but his march was hardly stealthy. The
column soon came upon a large herd of buffalo. While the General’s
disciplined troopers stayed in ranks, the Crow and Shoshone scouts swept
into action and killed many of the large animals. This big and noisy hunting
foray certainly meant that the Sioux would learn of their advance. Crook
was “annoyed” by this action, “which could not help alarming the wary foe
with whom he had to contend; but nothing could check the Indians.”111
After the buffalo hunt, the men continued their march. Lt. Bourke
commented on the beauty of the landscape stating that the grass was
“emerald green.” There were few trees in the region, “but wild-roses by
the thousand laid their delicate beauties at our feet.” These large numbers
of rose bushes in the area gave the Rosebud River its name. After a lengthy
march of 35 or 40 miles, the troopers finally came on the banks of “the
extreme head-waters of the Rosebud.” The tired men dined on buffalo
meat and made camp. Believing that there were hostile Sioux Indians
nearby, the army took proper precautions that night. They established
their lines in a hollow square with the horses inside, so they could not
be stolen. Each man slept with his saddle for a pillow and kept his rifle
nearby in case it would be needed on short notice. Late in the night, the
Indian scouts returned stating that they had surprised a small band of
110
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Band of Sioux Warriors, 1898.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

Sioux hunters. These warriors ran away so rapidly that they left their meat
that they were cooking on the fire. The soldiers were concerned as Bourke
explained, “we are now right in among the hostiles and [they] may strike
. . . at any hour.”112
The location of the army camp was probably known to any Sioux who
happened to be in the area. The Shoshone and Crow warriors celebrated
their hunt long into the night. These “boastful, howling Indians” lit fires
and made much noise, while the soldiers were under strict orders not
to light any campfires and to remain quiet. The night before the battle
Captain Alexander Sutorius used a saddle for a pillow, and then wrapped
himself in a blanket. Before he went to sleep, he commented to Finerty,
“We will have a fight tomorrow, mark my words—I feel it in the air.”113
The Swiss was a highly experienced soldier, and he had a good sense of
what was going to happen. His opinion proved to be a premonition.
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The Indian Warriors
When the winter weather ended in 1876, the Sioux and Cheyenne
began to assemble in the area of the Yellowstone River including its
tributary, the Rosebud. They arrived for weeks. Some of them came from
various government reservations, while others had been away from the
white man’s influence the previous winter. The Sioux groups included
the Miniconjou, Hunkpapa, Oglala, Brule, Sans Arc, Sihasapa, and a
few Santee, who had long been impoverished after fighting the whites
in the Great Sioux Uprising in Minnesota in 1862. In addition, groups
of Northern Cheyenne and even Southern Cheyenne, who came long
distances, also converged on the area. The combined numbers of warriors
was large by any standard. One prominent study has estimated that the
number of Indian lodges was at least 461, but it would have been much
larger.114
The Indian ponies had become weak, because in the winter when
the grass was covered with snow, the animals were unable to eat it. But
when the weather improved in the late spring, the grass began to grow,
and the horses became stronger and were better able to sustain lengthy
and rapid marches. This meant that the warriors were then capable of
traveling long distances and striking at their enemies. As Wooden Leg
stated, many of the young men were eager to find and fight the soldiers,
“but the chiefs and old men all urged us to keep away from the white
men.”115 This changed after the optimistic vision from Sitting Bull because
he stated that the Indians would be victorious in an upcoming fight. This
made many more Sioux and Cheyenne willing to risk battle.
Sitting Bull was a respected leader of the Hunkpapa Sioux, and he
believed his people should live far away from white people and get nothing
from them. He believed his followers were wealthy in everything they
needed, and many Indians respected him because he was “a man whose
medicine was good.” The chief had a “kind heart and good judgment
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as to the best course of conduct,” and he was considered “brave, but
peaceable.”116
The Hunkpapa and the other Sioux groups came together in their
annual Sun Dance from June 7 to 10. This was an elaborate ceremony that
was to assure that the buffalo would be fertile, and that the men would
have success in the hunt. As part of the ceremony, Sitting Bull sought a
vision that would help his people understand the future. Jumping Bull
used an awl, which was used to punch small holes in leather, and cut 100
pieces of skin out of Sitting Bull’s arms. The chief then danced around a
pole for hours. He finally stopped and stood looking just below the sun
up, and he saw a vision. The chief saw soldiers and horses as numerous as
locust falling upside down into an Indian village. A few Indians also fell
upside down. Sitting Bull also heard a voice that said, “These soldiers do
not possess ears. They are to die, but you are not supposed to take their
spoils [plunder their bodies].”117 The upside-down Indians meant that
warriors would die as well, but the vision clearly showed that the Sioux
and their allies were going to win a great victory. This prophecy came true
twice before the end of the month because the Indians would win the
battles of the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn within a few weeks.
The prominent war chief of the Oglala Sioux was Crazy Horse who
enjoyed a fine reputation among his people and the admiration of his
adversaries. Lieutenant Bourke met Crazy Horse after the campaigns
of 1876 and described how the Sioux regarded him. “All Indians gave
him a high reputation for courage and generosity. In advancing upon an
enemy, none of his warriors were allowed to pass him.” In addition, “He
had made hundreds of friends by his charity towards the poor, as it was
point of honor with him never to keep anything for himself, excepting
weapons of war. I never heard an Indian mention his name save in terms
of respect.”118
While he was not a medicine man, he clearly led a charmed life,
and, reportedly, nine horses had been killed out from under him when
Wooden Leg, A Warrior, 178.
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he was riding them. He had an impressive reputation, and his example
of bravery made the other warriors more courageous. Crazy Horse said
he had once seen a vision of a man who came out of a lake on horseback.
The apparition told the leader neither to wear a war bonnet nor braid the
tale of his pony, and the vision told him that no bullet would ever kill
him. This prophecy proved to be accurate because the war chief was killed
by a bayonet thrust, not by a bullet, in 1877. Following the advice of the
vision, Crazy Horse never wore a war bonnet and never braided the tail of
his horse. He was not involved in tribal councils, and he never took part
in treaty negotiations. Above all, he was a warrior, and he was among the
best military leaders in the Sioux nation.119
Late in the day of June 16, 1876, Cheyenne scouts rode into the main
Indian camp making wolf howls which signified danger. The warriors had
found their adversaries on the Rosebud, and the banks of the stream were
black with soldiers and their Indian allies. Enthusiastically, the young
Sioux and Cheyenne men called for action and looked to Crazy Horse
for leadership, but the elders of the tribes were cautious. They reminded
the warriors that the women, the aged, and the young still needed to be
protected in camp. But the aggressive young men argued that they should
attack the soldiers before the army could strike the camp. Crazy Horse
finally suggested that the older men stay and protect the camp while
most of the young men should attack and drive the soldiers away. This
council seemed sound, and the warriors prepared to attack. The Indians
divided themselves into war parties comprised of men from the various
groups. They put on their war paint and special clothing for combat.
They probably rode 25 miles throughout much of the night, and arrived
at the army’s camp early in the morning, at the right time to surprise the
soldiers.120
Before he left for battle that evening, Spotted Wolf, the father of
White Shield, gave his son some good advice. The older man told White
Shield that he should not allow his pony to graze before the battle. “If a
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horse’s stomach is not full, he can run a long way; if his stomach is full,
he soon gets tired.” Spotted Wolf also told his son that he should drink
plenty of water before the battle because he would have little chance to
drink during combat. In addition, Spotted Wolf said, “I will put some
medicine on you.” He placed a whistle around his son’s neck made of
bone from an eagle’s wing and said, “If anyone runs up to you to shoot
you, make this noise [blowing on the whistle] and the bullet will not hurt
you.”121 Apparently, Spotted Wolf ’s medicine was good because White
Shield survived the battle, and he also fought bravely.
The Indians were well armed. Many of them wielded lever-action
Spencer, Winchester, and Henry rifles. These weapons were rapidfire repeaters, which could do considerable damage at close range. In
comparison, the soldiers used the single-shot Springfield Model 1873 rifle,
which had a slow rate of fire. This weapon was accurate when shooting at
a distance of several hundred yards, but it was at a decided disadvantage
in close combat when the rate of fire was the most important factor in
effectiveness. The fact that the warriors had more efficient weapons than
the army was an important reason why they were victorious in both the
battles of the Rosebud and the Little Bighorn. The Indians also enjoyed a
numerical advantage in both engagements. Crazy Horse later claimed there
were 1,500 warriors who struck the army camp at the Rosebud River in
four war parties.122 In an impressive feat of movement and coordination,
these war groups arrived simultaneously early in the morning and caught
the soldiers off guard.

The Battle of the Rosebud: Initial Attacks
General Crook ordered the soldiers awakened at three a.m. on the
morning of June 17, 1876, and the command was on the march at six
a.m. Crook hoped that his men would soon locate the Indian village, so he
could attack it. Henry W. Daly reported that the march was challenging.
George Bird Grinnel, The Fighting Cheyennes, (Norman. Okla.: University of
Oklahoma), 337-8.
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“The Rosebud is as crooked as a corkscrew, and the country is very rough.”
The men went “through the narrow, winding valley, unable to see 50 feet
ahead.”123 The men were cheerful when they marched that morning. They
joked with each other and gave chewing tobacco to their friends. A few
of the younger soldiers, showing the skill of experienced cavalrymen, held
the pommels of the saddles, leaned forward against their horses, and took
brief naps without falling off their mounts. The column was ordered to
halt at eight a.m. and unsaddle their mounts to allow the animals to graze
on the grass nearby. The march the previous day had been challenging,
and Crook wanted to give the men and their horses a chance to get their
strength back.124
Many of the soldiers rested along the banks of the Rosebud. John
Finerty commented on the “thick growth of wild roses” along the stream.
As the men relaxed, Finerty noticed that the soldiers were surrounded by
hills that “seemed to rise on every side, and we were within easy musket
shot of those most remote.” The army was in a position of a potential trap.
Indians on the surrounding hills could fire down upon the soldiers, and
the warriors would have a big advantage over their adversaries. Fortunately
for the army, Shoshone and Crow warriors were scouting in advance of
this position, and they were in a position to warn the soldiers if the Sioux
and Cheyenne were nearby.125
Finerty was laying in the grass and resting his head on his saddle
at 8:30 a.m., when he and the soldiers heard a few shots coming from
the hills to the north. “Captain Sutorius, with Lieutenant [Adolphus
H.] Von Leuttwitz, who had been transferred to Company E, sat near
me smoking.” Von Leuttwitz was a German from Prussia, and the Swiss
and German got along well. They could have exchanged pleasant barbs
in their native languages. Then, “we heard a few shots from behind the
bluffs to the north.” Sutorius initially seemed not to be concerned, and
stated, “They are shooting buffaloes over there,” perhaps assuming that
the Indian scouts were hunting again.126
123
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Sioux Charging at the Battle of the Rosebud.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

The men began to realize that the shots were fired in more than
one direction because there was an “alternate rise and fall in the reports
[sounds]” of the guns, and they began to worry that something else might
be taking place. At that point, the troopers saw 20 or 40 of their Indian
scouts appear on the crest of the hills to the north riding toward the
soldiers “with incredible speed.” The Crow and Shoshone scouts were
clearly excited, and they were shouting, “Heap [many] Sioux! Heap
Sioux!”127
Captain Anson Mills was the first officer to see the attacking warriors
and perceive the danger. Mills did not understand the shouting because of
his poor hearing, but he saw the agitated scouts and went to investigate.
He rode to the crest of a nearby hill and looked north. “I saw on the crest
of the horizon about two miles distant, great numbers of moving objects.”
He only stared briefly before he knew what they were. “I soon came to the
conclusion that they were Indians in great numbers.” He ordered his men
127
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to mount shouting, “Saddle up, there—saddle up, there, quick!” General
Crook was unable to see the approaching Indians because he was nearer
to the river, and the hills blocked his view. Mills soon found him playing
cards with some of his officers and told the General of the advancing
warriors. Crook ordered Mills to report to him with his command as soon
as possible. The General began to direct the deployment of his men, and
he ordered his subordinate officer to march as rapidly as possible to the
“higher ground to take the bluffs and hold them.”128
The cavalry scout, Frank Grouard, was resting when the Crow and
Shoshone called the alarm. One of them, an Indian called Humpy, a
hunchbacked Crow, was yelling “Sioux” as he approached the camp. At
the same time, Grouard heard the Sioux war cry, and he saw the warriors
attacking over the hills. Everyone sprang into action. Initially, the soldiers
were poorly prepared to meet their charging adversaries, and only the
Indian scouts were ready to hold the line and meet the advance. Grouard
admitted, “I believe if it had not been for the Crows, the Sioux would
have killed half of our command before the soldiers were in a position to
meet the attack.”129
The combat was at close quarters, and many Crows and Sioux
engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. Grouard was in a position from which
he could see the entire encounter, and he said it “was the prettiest sight
in the way of a fight that I had ever seen.” The two sides were engaged at
such close quarters that the scout “could hardly distinguish our allies from
the hostiles.” Only when the soldiers advanced and started firing did the
Sioux fall back. The troopers had trouble telling the two groups of Indians
from the other, but the Sioux and Crows easily recognized each other, and
they knew whom to fight.130
Many of the Indian scouts faced the fight with grim determination.
Grouard saw a wounded Crow warrior sitting on the ground during the
battle. He had been shot just above the knee and his leg “was terribly
shattered. His horse was lying dead by his side.” The man seemed to

128
129
130

Mills, My Story, 404-5.
Grouard, Adventures, 117.
Grouard, Adventures, 117.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021

63

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 3, Art. 5

The Battle of the Rosebud

61

have lost interest in his wound, and he would often “yell like a madman”
obviously in support of the other scouts engaged in the battle.131
Captain Sutorius and Lieutenant Von Luettwitz were soon mounted
with their troops, and they anxiously awaited permission to engage the
enemy. Luettwitz asked impatiently, “Why the d—l don’t they order
us to charge?” The Swiss captain responded, “Here comes Lemley (the
regimental adjutant) now. . . . How do you feel about it, eh?” As the officers
waited to be employed in battle, Sutorius turned to the newspaper man,
John Finerty, and asked him what he thought of the delay. The reporter
almost changed the subject when he stated rather absentmindedly, “It is
the anniversary of Bunker Hill. . . . The day is of good omen.” “By Jove, I
never thought of that,” Sutorius cried.132
The Battle of Bunker hill took place on June 17, 1775, during
the American War of Independence. On that day, 101 years earlier, the
poorly-trained American militia had shown their fighting ability by
mowing down more than 1,000 of the highly effective British infantry
sent against them. While the Americans were eventually forced to retreat,
they had fought well, and many Americans considered the battle to be
a big success.133 Sutorius was pleased to realize that they were fighting
on a date that celebrated the fighting ability of Americans, and he used
the news to inspire his men. He shouted in a voice loud enough for the
soldiers to hear, “It is the anniversary of Bunker Hill. We’re in luck.” The
men responded by waving their rifles in acknowledgment.134
A messenger, Lieutenant Henry Lemley, soon arrived with orders
from Crook, “Your battalion will charge those bluffs on the center.”
Immediately, Sutorius and Luettwitz, the Swiss and German, led their
men in support of the attack by Captain Mills.135 Captain Mills had
marched his men on horseback as rapidly as possible through the rough
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terrain that was littered with broken rocks. As soon as the ground became
more level and suitable for an attack, the Captain gave the orders “front
into line,” and he told the bugler to sound the charge. Mills could see two
prominent rocky ridges, and when his command reached the first one, the
warriors on that position began to fall back. The Captain ordered his men
to dismount and to continue the attack up the hill on foot. The soldiers
engaged their adversaries at the foot of the ridge and charged right through
them. The Sioux soon fell back to the top of the ridge.
This engagement allowed Mills the opportunity to have a good look
at the enemy warriors. “These Indians were most hideous, every one being
painted in the most hideous colors and designs, stark naked, except their
moccasins, breech clouts, and head gear, the latter consisting of feathers
and horns; some of the horses being also painted.” In fact, “their shouting
and personal appearance was so hideous that it terrified the horses more
than our men and rendered them almost uncontrollable before we
dismounted and placed them behind the rocks.”136
Despite the disgusting appearance of his adversaries, the Captain
clearly admired their fighting ability. “The Indians proved then and there
that they were the best cavalry soldiers on earth.” This was high praise
indeed because Mills was a highly-experienced officer who fought as a
cavalry commander for four years in the American Civil War of 18615, and he knew able fighters when he saw them. The Sioux clearly
demonstrated their exceptional skill in the engagement with the troopers.
“In charging up towards us they exposed little of their person, hanging
on with one arm around the neck and one leg over the horse, firing and
lancing from underneath the horse’s necks, so that there was no part of
the Indian at which we could aim.” Many years later, Mills lamented
the demise of the fighting power of the Sioux. They were “then the best
cavalry in the world; their like will never be seen again.”137
Captain Mills observed the Sioux as they attacked. “The Indians
came not in a line, but in flocks or herds like buffalo.” They also advanced
in great numbers, “and they piled in upon us until I think there must have
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U.S. Cavalry engaging the Indians at close quarters.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

been 1,000 or 1,500 in our immediate front.” When the Captain noticed
that the enemy warriors were reluctant to storm the cavalry’s position, he
continued to be aggressive and ordered his men to charge another “the
second” ridge. This position was taken with little difficulty and Mills again
ordered his men to take up positions near the boulders on the hills.138 The
Captain had shown initiative, but his more-advanced location offered few
advantages, and he had over-extended his lines leaving some men in danger.
Henry W. Daly saw the approach of the Indians differently than
Captain Mills. When the Sioux and Cheyenne advanced in a “solid phalanx,”
Daly stated, “There were no handsomer Indians and no better riders.” They
were dressed splendidly. “From the forehead to the waistline, each warrior
was painted with stripes of black and red. Their gorgeous headdresses fanned
the breeze like the tails of a boy’s kite.” The warriors showed discipline and
138
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great skill, and “they attacked with great fury and with the precision of
trained cavalry.” The Sioux and Cheyenne stated that they only wanted to
fight the soldiers, and they shouted to the Crows and Shoshones, “You go
home! We want to kill only white men!” But the Indian allies of the troopers
were unmoved by this trick and remained loyal to the army.139
Daly was one of the “packers” who took care of the horses and mules
used to carry supplies. Even though they were not combat troops, they
were badly needed in battle. They advanced, were placed in a position
on the center of the line, and held a ledge when the Indians attacked.
The white men were soon surrounded, and the warriors attempted to
overwhelm them by a series of attacks. The Indians made a determined
advance and came so close to Daly and the others that “we fired point
blank, but on they came.” A few of them reached the top of the ledge,
“and one of them came at me with a tomahawk.” The warrior struck Daly
with the weapon giving the packer “a scar over my right eye,” which was a
constant reminder to him of the action that day. The packers were unable
to hold their position long and soon had to withdraw.140
When the firing began, Lieutenant Bourke was with General Crook,
and the younger officer took the opportunity to lead men into battle. The
Lieutenant accompanied his dismounted cavalrymen in their attack on
the ridges. The aggressive officer was disappointed that his adversaries fell
back when his men came close to their positions. But the Sioux returned
fire and inflicted a severe wound on Sergeant Maher, who was hit in
the right arm near the elbow. Bourke was very impressed with Elmer A.
Snow, a trumpeter with the company, who had gallantly accompanied
the Lieutenant in the attack. When orders came to fall back, Bourke and
Snow, who were both still on horseback, found themselves isolated far
ahead of the other soldiers. A group of “30 or more” Sioux, seeing their
vulnerability, attacked the two men. The Lieutenant fired his rifle and
shouted, hoping to distract the warriors. The Sioux halted momentarily
allowing Bourke and Snow the chance of racing their horses 400 yards
back to the soldiers. The Lieutenant was lucky. The trumpeter was not.
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“My usual good fortune attended me, but poor Snow got back to our lines
badly shot through both arms, near the wrists.”141
The scout, Frank Grouard, said that Snow was unable to control his
horse, when the order was given to retreat, and the animal “ran away with
him,” straight for the Indians. When the hapless bugler was close to the
warriors, he was finally able to turn his horse, but he was shot through
both wrists. He had lost the ability to use his hands which were simply
“dangling” from his arms. Snow called for help, and Grouard came to his
aid. The scout got close to the Snow’s mount, but he could not grab the
reins. He finally struck the horse on the head which caused the animal to
hesitate, and the wounded man finally threw himself off the mount.142 Elmer
A. Snow was crippled for the rest of his life, but he won the Medal of Honor
for his actions that day. This was the highest award for military courage in
the United States. The citation for his honor reads, “Bravery in action; was
wounded in both arms.”143 While trumpeter Snow was courageous, he might
have owed his medal to the nature of his wounds as much as to his valor.
While the soldiers had held their positions, some Indians had
advanced unexpectedly through a ravine to the left and rear of the soldiers.
They had reached the spring where General Crook was resting when he
heard the first shots of the battle. A Shoshone boy had accompanied
the command, and when the engagement began, he asked a chief for
permission go back to the spring and paint his face to be ready to enter his
first battle. The Sioux found him there and “shot him through the back
and killed him, taking his scalp from the nape of the neck to the forehead,
leaving his entire skull ghastly and white.”144 A young Sioux boy also died
at about the same time. The child followed one of the warriors into the
conflict, but he missed a turn in the confusion of battle, and he went too
far ahead of the others. He was unable to flee, and the Indian scouts with
the army captured and killed him.145
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General Crook saw that his command was under attack by numerous
and aggressive adversaries, and he responded with bold tactics. The General
could have concentrated his forces in a restricted area to make any assaults
against his position hopeless because his troops could concentrate their
fire on any attack by the Indians, but he decided to spread his units far
apart. He clearly thought that deploying the soldiers on a lengthy front
would allow him to hold his positions, while giving him the ability of
aiming damaging attacks against the Indians. Crook never fully realized
that this was a dangerous tactic. His men were deployed over three miles,
which meant that they could not concentrate as much firepower against
their adversaries, and they would be slow to support each other in the
case of emergencies. Much of the battle was actually separate engagements
spread over large distances in which Crook’s troops fought with little
support from the other groups.
Additionally, General Crook and his men also used tactics that
favored their enemies. The Sioux and Cheyenne warriors had no interest
in holding positions, and the army’s attempt to take and hold various
hills and ridges had little impact in the outcome of the fighting. Thunder
Hawk, a warrior with the Sioux, described how the Indians used the
aggressiveness of the soldiers to the Indians’ advantage. He stated that
groups of warriors would often attack in succession, after luring the cavalry
into a dangerous situation. “As the first group attacked the foremost van
of the enemy another was held in check, and, as soon as the leading body
had become engaged, a second group was dispatched from a right angle.
The troops were now being pressed on both sides and with telling blows.”
A third group of warriors would then be deployed against the troops.
“While these two attacks were being stressed with savage fury, the third,
and last group was released, arriving from the left flank, [which] succeeded
in almost encircling the detachment.” At that point, the soldiers were in a
dangerous position and had to retreat.146
Crook’s and many of his officers were experienced Indian fighters
who clearly understood the Indian tactics of luring the soldiers into a
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position where a counterattack would be most effective. But the army
waged the entire battle in a manner that gave the warriors the greatest
advantage. The army leadership should have known better, and they gave
needless advantages to the warriors. The General and his officers were fools
who recklessly exposed their men to unnecessary risks that endangered
the command and resulted in avoidable casualties.
Wooden Leg, a Cheyenne, assessed the overall nature of the fighting
very well, and he stated that the tactics of the warriors were used during
the entire battle. “Until the sun went far toward the west, there were
charges back and forth. Our Indians fought and ran away, fought and ran
away. The soldiers and their Indian scouts did the same. Sometimes we
chased them, sometimes they chased us.”147

The Battle of the Rosebud: Intense Fighting on the Left
The battle soon became fully engaged up and down the line, and
Lieutenant James Foster described the din of battle as “a continuous
rattle.” Five companies of cavalry under the command of Colonel William
B. Royall, Crook’s second in command, rode to secure the left flank.
Company I under Captain William H. Andrews was on the far left of
Royall’s men, and Lieutenant Foster’s platoon controlled the left side of
the company. In this position, Foster’s men were the key to securing that
entire section of the line, and they took aggressive action. “Sounding the
charge, the gallant fellows dashed forward” driving the Sioux before them.
The troopers “pressed on under a galling fire and drove the enemy from a
strong position among some rocks.” The warriors, “although superior in
force, position, and arms, broke before the gallant little party and were
driven pell-mell from the ridge.” The troopers charged firing their pistols,
and they advanced over two more ridges.148
At this point, this small group of men were well ahead of their lines,
and they were in danger of being surrounded and killed. Foster ordered

147
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Indians engaging the U.S. Cavalry.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

his men to fall back, but they were still under heavy fire. The Sioux seemed
to fire in a “sweeping discharge” or volley that came from the “the left and
right” simultaneously. The shots wounded Private Charles Stuart “through
the hand and forearm and Private [James] O’Brien in the arm.”149 Private
Phineas Towne was very impressed with the size of the Sioux forces. “I
never saw so great a body of Indians in one place as I saw at that time, and
I have seen a great many Indians in my time.” There were so many that “it
seemed that if one Indian was shot, there were five to take his place.”150
The situation of the men with Lieutenant Foster became more
serious when their horses got loose and “galloped madly away.” This left
the “troopers at the mercy of the savage Sioux.” The group of men were
unable to retrieve additional bullets because their mounts had ran away
with the extra cartridge boxes in their saddle pouches, and the soldiers
Foster “From Fort Fetterman,” Eyewitnesses, 278.
Towne, “Ex-Trooper Towne on the Rosebud Fight,” in Cyrus Townsend
Brady, Indian Fights and Fighters, (New York: Doubleday, 1913), 206-7.
149
150
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soon ran out of ammunition. The men, led by Sergeant David Marshall,
had no recourse but to use their rifles as clubs, and they “fought bravely to
the last.” Apparently, one young recruit had an “insane idea of surrender.”
If so, he was quite foolish because he could expect torture and death if he
were captured. He “calmly gave up his carbine, handing it to the nearest
Sioux, and was brained instead by a blow from its butt.” In a brief period
of time, “five men fell dead and as many more were wounded.”151
One of these men who fell was Sergeant David Marshall, who had
been shot through the face and was seriously wounded. When Private
Towne was retreating, he came upon three troopers carrying Marshall.
Towne glanced behind him, saw the warriors approaching, and called to
the others, “Quick, here they come!” The men dropped the Sergeant and
ran to their horses to save their lives. Bravely, Marshall told Towne to flee
as well, “Save yourself if you can, because I am dying. Don’t stay with
me.” Both men were in Company F, and the private refused to abandon
his friend. He said, “Dave, old boy, I am going to stay right here with you
and will not desert you.” Towne did the best he could, “Grasping him
with all my strength, I carried my comrade.” The Private’s effort proved
futile because he finally realized, “it was useless to carry him any further,
for he was dead.”152 Despite his best efforts, Towne had been unable to
save his friend. At least, Sergeant Marshall did not have to die alone. Even
though the Private never received the Medal of Honor—an accolade he
richly deserved—for risking his life to rescue his friend, his sacrifice was
still one of the most courageous and merciful acts of the entire battle.
Seeing he could do nothing further for the dead man, the Private
then laid the corpse down and attempted to escape, but he was soon
surrounded by the “most murderous looking Indians I ever saw.” The
Indians had Towne badly outnumbered, and they soon subdued him. In
an instant, they took his rifle and tossed a lasso over his head which fell
to his ankles. They soon tightened it around his feet. The Private was
helpless, and “I struggled and fought in vain, until I was struck on the
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head with something which rendered me unconscious and caused me to
fall. As I went down a bullet struck me in the body.” Towne had been
shot in the abdomen. He soon regained his senses only to realize that
he was being dragged over the ground behind an Indian pony. A group
of cavalrymen charged the warriors and saved Towne either from being
dragged to death or taken away to be tortured.153
Private Towne’s fate was far different from Private Richard Bennett
who was captured. Private Bennet “was badly wounded and lay hid in
the rocks as the Sioux charged by.” The unfortunate soldier mistook these
Indians for friendly Crow scouts, and he called out to them for aid. The
Sioux “cut him to pieces with their long-handled (eight foot) tomahawks
and lances.”154 According to Private Towne, Bennet was “completely cut
to pieces. His remains were buried in a grain sack.”155 Sergeant Marshall’s
corpse was retrieved by a small group of men led by Private Gerold J.
O’Grady, who charged through a “shower of bullets” to retrieve the body
and keep it from mutilation.156
White Shield may have been the man who killed Sergeant Marshall.
The warrior saw a trooper on horseback, and he fired when the soldier
turned his head to give an order. The bullet entered the man’s head
“just over the eyebrow.” The warrior thought he had killed an officer,
but no cavalry officer died that day. White Shield might have confused
the Sergeant’s insignia with that of an officer. The Indian later found the
corpse of this soldier he had killed, and he took the revolver from the dead
man.157
Other soldiers fell in the battle. Sergeant William W. Allen’s horse
was shot twice, the animal fell, and he was forced to fight on foot. He
was unable to flee and bravely turned to face his enemies rather than run,
“determined to sell his life as dearly as possible. He stood firing his rifle
until two Sioux came up to him on opposite sides and shot him down.”
Towne, 208.
Bourke, Diaries, 331.
155
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The badly wounded man still tried to resist, and he tried to draw his
pistol, but a warrior “struck the poor fellow over the ear, thus ending the
unequal contest.” Sergeant Groesch was badly wounded, and he lay on the
ground nearby, but he was saved from death by the arrival of the friendly
Crows and Shoshones who took him back to the aid station.158
When his men reached the other companies on the left flank,
Lieutenant Foster estimated that they were assailed by 500 ro 700 Indians,
and shots were coming from the left and rear, which bothered some of the
troopers who started to withdraw. The “officer in charge,” explained to his
men the severity of the situation and stated, “Men we must hold the hill.”
“All right, sir,” replied one of his soldiers, “if you say so, we’ll hold it till
hell freezes over.” They then returned to the fight and held the ground.159
Foster described the scene, no doubt with some exaggeration, as
the “hottest encounter that had ever taken place between Indians and
soldiers.” The fighting intensified, and “the affair now became serious.”
The officers realized that the soldiers needed to keep enough ammunition
to make sure they had sufficient for any emergency. The leaders told the
troopers “to fire only when they had a fair assurance of hitting their man.”
When the Indians attacked, “the men received them steadily and, pouring
in volley after volley, drove them back in confusion.” The battle seemed to
increase in fury, and “the firing was now terrific, the repeating rifles used
by the Indians enabling them to make it one continuous volley.”160
The action of the day had reduced the numbers of troopers in the
companies considerably. The men had dismounted to fire more accurately
at their foes, but one out of four men had to hold the horses. Some
soldiers were wounded and others were assigned to bring them to the aid
station. At the critical moment, only 70 men were in their position to
await the “onslaught of the enemy, who were now pouring in a rolling,
continuous fire from rocks, ravines, and cover.” The officers, including
Foster and Captain Guy V. Henry, stayed on their horses “rode up and
down the line, encouraging the men and cautioning them to waste no
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ammunition, but wait for the charge.” The warriors yelled what sounded
like, “Yip! Yip! Hi-Yah!, Hi-Yah,” and dashed toward the line. The soldiers
took a few steps back, then regained their courage, returned to their
positions, and “poured a withering volley into the rascals, repulsing them
with considerable loss.” But the soldiers were still taking casualties and
the “gallant little line already too small, was rapidly thinning.”161 At this
critical point in the battle, Captain Henry was shot in the face and badly
wounded.
Henry was an experienced soldier who had a crippled hand because
he suffered from frostbite in the winter campaign of 1874-5 in the Black
Hills. He was “unable to bend or close my fingers” of his left hand for
the rest of his life.162 In the fighting Captain Henry said, “I felt a sharp
sting as of being slapped in the face, and a blinding rush of blood to my
head and eyes.” He later described the nature of his wound. “A bullet had
struck me in the face, under my left eye, passing through the upper part
of my mouth, under the nose and out below the right eye.”163 Finerty
stated that the Captain “was struck by a bullet which passed through both
cheek bones, broke the bridge of his nose and destroyed the optic nerve in
one eye.” One of his men tried to help him, but this trooper was also hit.
Henry courageously stood his ground “temporarily blinded as he was and
throwing blood from his mouth by the handful.” The Captain managed
to remain on his horse for several minutes standing in front of the enemy
all the time and calling to his men, “On. On! Charge.” Finally, the brave
man collapsed and fell to the ground. The Sioux continued their advance
over his prostrate body, but they were driven back by the soldiers, and
members of his command were finally able to bring Henry safely to their
lines.164
Frank Grouard reported that it was an Indian scout who rescued
Captain Henry. According to Grouard, the Captain was laying helpless on
the ground as the Sioux pressed forward. One of the Indian scouts, Yute
Foster, “From Fort Fetterman,” Eyewitnesses, 279-80.
Guy V. Henry, “A Winter March to the Black Hills,” in Eyewitnesses, 187.
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John, ran to the fallen officer. The scout got off his horse and defended the
wounded man. All alone, he kept his adversaries at bay until the soldiers
started firing and drove the Sioux warriors away. Yute John then picked
up Henry on his back and carried him to safety. “If it had not been for
the Indian (Yute John), Col. [Captain] Henry would have been killed and
scalped where he fell.”165 The badly wounded man agreed, but he gave
another name for the heroic man who saved his life, “had it not been for
Washakie, chief of the Shoshones, fighting over my body, my scalp would
have been lifted,” and he would have been killed.166
While Captain Henry lay in agony behind the lines, the battle for
the hill continued. As Lieutenant Foster described, “Again the Sioux
advanced.” The warriors charged the right of the army’s line and kept up
a “scorching enfilading fire.” The soldiers were waiting for reinforcements
that never arrived, “The gallant little band fought on with a desperate
courage hardly to be believed if not actually seen.” One trooper thought
they could hold out only as long as they had ammunition, and he said to
another man, “Jack, it’s only a question of cartridges.” An officer agreed
about the gravity of the situation and admonished the soldiers to go down
fighting, “Well I guess we’re done for. Better die right here, facing the
rascals, than give way an inch, and go down with a lance in the back
further to the rear.”167
Sergeant John Henry Shingle had been given command of the
detachment holding the horses behind the front. When he saw some of
the men in the battle line waver, break ranks, and turn to flee, he mounted
a horse and rushed forward to rally the men at this critical juncture in
the battle. He yelled in a huge voice, “Face them, men! On them, face
them!”168 For his valor that day, Shingle was given the Medal of Honor.
His courage and determination rallied the men who returned to the
fight and held their positions. Sergeant Joseph Robinson also earned the
Medal of Honor in the action. His citation stated he won the award for,
“Discharging his duties while in charge of the skirmish line under fire
165
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with judgment and great coolness and brought up the lead horses at a
critical moment.”169
Despite the courage of the cavalrymen on the left in holding their
position, an attack by the infantry probably decided this part of the
engagement. The foot soldiers had been holding the center of the line
for hours, and they finally rushed to help the men on the left. Captain T.
B. Burrowes and Captain Andrew S. Burt led their companies in driving
off the Sioux. The men “moved forward at double time and on reaching
the ridge stopped the Indians quickly and decisively without loss on our
part.” The warriors withdrew, and the army held the hills.170
As the battle raged, Captain Henry was taken to the rear area “to have
my wound dressed.” Although his wounds were severe, the Captain wanted
to return to the fight, but “the Surgeon forbid me doing so.”171 Finerty, the
news reporter, saw Henry at the aid station, “lying on a blanket, his face
covered with a bloody cloth, around which the summer flies were buzzing
fiercely.” The men did their best to help the wounded officer. One soldier
kept the Captain’s horse near him, so the animal blocked the sunlight because
there was “no other shade in the neighborhood.” When the reporter tried to
comfort him, Henry firmly replied, “It is nothing. For this are we soldiers!”
The Captain even tried to recruit Finerty to join the service, and he gave the
reporter “the honor of advising me to join the army!”172
Captain Anson Mills came behind the lines to visit his wounded
men. When Captain Henry heard his voice, the wounded man called to
him. Mills did not know his old friend had been hit and was surprised to
see Henry with “his breast all covered with clotted blood, his eyes swollen
so he could not see.” Mills asked, “Henry, are you badly wounded?” The
injured man replied, “The doctors have just told me that I must die,
but I will not.” Mills thought that nine out of ten men would have died
from such wounds, but, surprisingly, Henry survived.173 Even though he
remained blind in one eye, he continued his military career. He belatedly
169
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received the Medal of Honor in 1893 for his courage at the Battle of
Cold Harbor in 1864 during the Civil War. Henry also fought in the war
with Spain in 1898, became a brigadier general, served briefly as military
governor of Puerto Rico, and died in 1899.174
Captain Henry was not the only man suffering from wounds who
impressed Finerty. The hospital was located under some trees near the
stream, and the wounded soldiers and Indian scouts were brought there
for treatment. “Most of the injured men bore their sufferings stoically
enough, but an occasional groan or half-smothered shriek would tell where
the knife, or the probe, had struck an exposed nerve.” Finerty was even
more impressed with the conduct of the scouts. “The Indian wounded,
some of them desperate cases, gave no indication of feeling, but submitted
to be operated upon with the grim stolidity of their race.”175

The Indians’ Battle
Many of the whites continued to observe the Indian tactics with
admiration. Robert E. Strahorn stated that they did much of their
fighting from horseback. “Some of the most reckless feats of equestrianism
imaginable were performed by them within range of the broadsides of
an entire company.” Often one or two of the warriors would dash from
behind the cover of the rocks. They would nearly tumble down the slope
of the hills to take a shot or two at their adversaries and then disappear
“like a flash” despite the volleys fired at them. One of the reckless foes
pressed too close to the cavalrymen and was in danger of being killed.
While his pony was running at full speed, the resourceful warrior took out
his Bowie knife, cut the strap holding the saddle on his horse, and “thus
unencumbered made his escape.” These men also “repeatedly courted
death by endeavoring to secure the bodies of their own dead.”176
Ben Arnold was a messenger for the army, and he “was not under
strict military discipline and was not expected to fight.” Even though he
“‘Fighting Guy V.’ Henry Stories of the Cavalryman Who is Commanding in
Puerto Rico,” The Denver Evening Post 24 Jan. 1899, 4.
175
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Indian warrior on horseback.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

did not participate in the battle, Arnold was in a position to observe
much of the combat. He saw a daring Sioux warrior “who seemed to have
a charmed life.” This man would skip back and forth taking advantage of
whatever protection the ground allowed him. When the soldiers advanced
close to him, he kept firing at them. The army skirmishers finally hit the
warrior, and he fell wounded, but he kept fighting. “He sat up and kept
pouring in his fire, determined to die selling his life dearly.” Finally, when
the front rank of the soldiers came within easy shooting distance from
him, the orders were given to the troops, “Halt! Take aim! Fire!” The
wounded Indian fell dead, riddled with bullets.177
177
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A group of about a dozen Sioux warriors fell back when they were
attacked by larger numbers of Crow scouts. One of the Sioux warriors
fired his gun at the advancing Crows until the rifle’s breech broke, and the
weapon became useless. Apparently, the hapless warrior tried to inspire
his comrades. He stood on a rock, with his arms extended, and began to
sing his death chant. He stated his name, “I, Yellow Ear Rings,” and he
sang, “I love these hills and valleys, My friends are in the number as grass.
But now I am as nothing. My friends, I am leaving you. You may even
now count me dead.” His companions were so impressed that they called
to him, “Yellow Ear Rings, you are too brave to die. We will not let you
die. If you are to die, we shall also die with you.” The Sioux warriors then
staged an impressive counterattack, pushed the scouts back, and rescued
their friend. The courage of Yellow Ear Rings not only saved his life but
also inspired his companions to fight harder.178
The battle raged over a such large distance, and there were so many
Indians engaged in the fighting, that no one leader could possibly have
directed all the action. But Crazy Horse was still a prominent chief, and
many of the Sioux near him looked to him for guidance. After the initial
charge by the Sioux and Cheyenne, the cavalry and their Indian scouts
counterattacked and pushed the warriors back. Many of the warriors were
on the verge of running away. At this critical junction, Crazy Horse called
to his men, “Hold on, my friends! Be strong! Remember the helpless ones
at home!” He led by example. He held his rifle high and rode toward
the soldiers shouting, “This is a good day to die!” He also yelled what
the famous Sioux war cry, “Hoka hey!” which means “Hurry! Hurry!” or
“Let’s go!”179 Crazy Horse, Bad Heart Bull, Black Deer, Kicking Bear, and
Good Weasel “rallied the Sioux, turned the charge, and got the soldiers
on the run.” These men had been able to inspire the Indians to stay in the
battle and to continue the fight. Short Buffalo gave his opinion of the war
chief ’s leadership in the battle, “Crazy Horse used good judgment in this
Rosebud fight.”180
Arnold, Camp Fires, 251-2.
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180
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Iron Hawk was a Hunkpapa Sioux, and he was 14 years old the
summer of the battle, but he “was a big boy,” so he participated in the
fight. He rode to the location of the engagement with a war party of 40
men. When they arrived, the battle was raging, and “the Crows were right
among us.” The fighting was at close quarters and the two sides were “all
mixed up.” There were so many enemy targets nearby that Iron Hawk
believed that he must have killed someone. “The way it was you couldn’t
keep from killing somebody if you didn’t get killed, and I am still alive.”
There was a Sioux warrior named Without-a-Tepee nearby, and a large
Crow scout pulled him off his horse. The two men disappeared in the
melee. The young warrior saw his friend, Sitting Eagle, fighting hand-tohand with another Crow scout, and it was the scout who fell. Iron Hawk
survived because he fled. “I ran for my life, because we could not fight all
those Crows and the soldiers too, and I was scared.” All the warriors ran,
but then Iron Hawk heard the rallying cries that the Sioux were using so
frequently that day, “Take courage! This is a good day to die! Think of the
children and the helpless at home!” The men all yelled “Hoka hey!” and
turned on their adversaries. This time the cavalry fled.
During the battle, Iron Hawk saw some smoke and went to
investigate. He found three Sioux eating a buffalo which they had killed.
They invited him to eat, and the warriors dined for a long time while the
battle raged. Finally, a Sioux man came to them who had obviously been
involved in the fighting because blood and dirt covered his face. He was
angry when he saw the others resting and eating during the engagement.
He said, “What are you doing here? We’re fighting! All you think of is to
eat! Why don’t you think about the helpless ones at home? Come make
haste! We have got to stand our ground!” Iron Hawk was ashamed, and he
returned to the battle.181
Lazy White Bull was a Sioux warrior. He cared little for singing war
songs, but he composed one and sang it when he was advancing toward the
soldiers. “Friends, try your best./I do not wish my father to be ashamed./
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Rosebud battlefield.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

Because he is a chief.” In one of the attacks, Lazy White Bull tried to ride
in front of the other warriors and led the advance. When he was finally
in front, he came face to face with a Shoshone scout who was wielding a
repeating rifle. The Indian scout rode directly for Lazy White Bull, and
the Shoshone fired his weapon twice, but he missed each time. The Sioux
warrior then fired twice and put two bullets in the right shoulder of the
scout’s horse. The animal went down, and the Shoshone ran. Lazy White
Bull chased the man and shot him in the right leg. The Sioux warrior
then retreated. This was long considered one of Lazy White Bull’s bravest
deeds. Many years later in the 1920s, the President of the United States,
Calvin Coolidge, visited the Indian reservation in South Dakota. Lazy
White Bull gave an address to welcome the President, and the warrior was
introduced as, “The Man Who Lamed the Shoshone.”182
Lazy White Bull stated that some of his close friends died that day
including Little Crow, Black Bird, Sitting Bear, and Little Wolf. The
number of dead would have probably been higher except for Lazy White
Lazy White Bull as cited in Indian Views, 19-21. Coolidge was President of
the United States from 1923 to 1929.
182
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Bull’s courage in saving two men. When Hawk Soldier’s horse was shot,
Lazy White Bull saved the warrior by carrying him to safety. In another
incident, a Indian’s horse was shot out from under him. The animal fell
on the rider and pinned him to the ground because his leg was caught
under the pony. Lazy White Bull bravely ran forward and protected the
defenseless warrior until he could free his leg and escape.183
There were about 200 Cheyenne warriors in the battle. While the
battle was quite fluid, and many Indians fought against more than one
segment of the soldiers’ line, the Cheyenne probably did most of their
fighting on the army’s left flank. Wooden Leg was a Northern Cheyenne
who was then 18 years old. When the news of the army’s approach reached
his camp, the old men admonished the youths to remain there and allow
the more mature men to fight. “Young men, leave the soldiers alone unless
they attack us.” But when night fell, the young warriors slipped away.
They rode all night long and arrived on the scene of action having slept
little and with tired horses, but they were ready to fight. Early in the
battle, one young man “charged too far” and got cut off by the Indian
scouts with the army. They shot his horse, but Wooden Leg and other
Cheyenne drove back his pursuers. Bravely, Wooden Leg pulled up the
man onto the back of his horse, and the two men made their escape.184
A group of Cheyenne advanced too far against their adversaries,
and they were nearly cut off from the other warriors. Their situation was
dangerous because Indian scouts were shooting down hill at them, and
the soldiers were nearly blocking their only avenue of retreat. The warriors
decided to flee for safety, but they thought it best to run one at a time. As
Two Moons advised, “Don’t all run together—one at a time!” When one
ran half the distance to safety, another man would start. Limpy, a crippled
man, went last. His horse was shot immediately, and it started kicking
and bucking. Soon Limpy fell to the ground. Two Moons rode back, and
Limpy jumped onto the back of the horse. The fire was so intense that
Two Moons later said he could almost feel the bullets touching his head.
Limpy later told John Stands in Timber about the fear and excitement he
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felt when running for his life. “When you are in a tight pinch like that it
seems like you don’t have no feelings. It seems like your feet don’t even
touch the ground.”185
Jack Red Cloud was the son of the Sioux Chief, Red Cloud, and
the young man was wearing a war bonnet in battle. His horse was killed,
and it was customary for an Indian warrior to take the bridle off the
dead horse to demonstrate his courage and “to show how cool he could
conduct himself.” But Jack Red Cloud forgot any display of manliness,
and he ran for his life. Three Crow scouts on horseback soon overtook
him and “lashed him with their pony whips and jerked off and kept his
war bonnet.” His pursuers teased him. They told him he was only a boy
and should not wear such a headdress. The young man, who was only 18
years of age, “was crying and asking mercy from the Crows.” The Crows
showed him compassion and let him live.186
White Wolf had a lever-action repeating rifle. The rapid-fire weapon
was a big advantage in combat, but it was also very dangerous to the man
who wielded it, and it had to be handled carefully. He rode into battle
with the gun in a scabbard on his left side. When he pulled it out, the rifle
accidentally discharged. The bullet went through his left leg and broke his
thigh bone. He survived the accident, but he limped for the rest of his
life.187
White Shield saw a soldier who was having trouble getting on his
horse. The warrior rode between him and his horse to knock the reins
out of the trooper’s hands. The Indian then killed his adversary. Scabby
Island [Eyelid?] saw another soldier fall off his horse. The warrior rode
forward and tried to strike the man on the ground with his whip. The
trooper caught the whip in his hand and pulled the Indian off his horse.
Each man survived unhurt. Two Moon thought that he would die in the
battle when he had to “leave his horse and run off on foot.” The situation
was very dangerous because “the bullets were flying pretty thick and were
knocking up the dirt all about him.” White Shield came to his rescue
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Buffalo Calf Woman rescues her brother.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

when he rode to the desperate man and told him to jump on the horse
beside him. When this animal became too tired to carry its load, the
men had to look for another means of escape. Contrary Belly then came
forward riding one horse and leading another. Two Moon jumped on the
pony and finally made good his escape.188
The most celebrated act of courage among the Cheyenne that day
was not performed by a warrior but by a woman. Buffalo Calf Road
Woman, the sister of Comes in Sight, accompanied her brother when he
marched to fight the soldiers. Showing great courage, Comes in Sight had
charged the army many times, and, as he rode up and down in front of
the enemy, his horse took a bullet and fell. White Elk was going in the
wrong direction when Comes in Sight fell, and the warrior was in a poor
position to come to the aid of the dismounted man. Then White Elk saw
Buffalo Calf Road Woman ride to help her brother. She passed him, so
when she returned, she would be riding the animal in the direction of
the Indians. Comes in Sight jumped on the back of her horse, and they
escaped. This act of courage was so famous among the Cheyenne that
188
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they always referred to the battle by the name, “Where the girl saved her
brother.”189
The Cheyenne gave detailed accounts of how one of their warriors
died that day. The various sources list his name as either Sunrise, Black
Sun, or Scabby. He will be referred to as Sunrise in this account. The
warrior took a long time to prepare for battle, and he covered himself with
yellow paint. This was very dangerous because the soldiers would clearly
notice such a conspicuous man, and the troopers would certainly direct
much of their fire at such a tempting target. Apparently, Sunrise had a
death wish or a premonition that he was going to die because he sang
these words when he went into battle, “I do not wish to be an old man.
This day is mine to die.”190 Initially, the warrior seemed to have a charmed
life because the soldiers shot at him many times but missed. “Finally one
of them got behind him and shot him through the body.”191 Sunrise was
not killed instantly, but he was unable to move as he lay on the ground.
Other Indians brought him off the battlefield, and they attempted to
treat his wounds, but he had been shot through the bowls, and his death
was only a matter of time. The man was very thirsty, but no one would
give him anything to drink because they knew it would kill him. Finally,
Sunrise said, “If I don’t drink I will die anyhow. If I drink now and die,
the sooner the better.” The others finally gave him some water, and he
died soon after.192

Decision on the Right Flank
While the battle was hotly contended on General Crook’s left, the
center of his line held firm. Early in the contest, the General had wisely
placed the infantry in this critical position. These men wielded the longerbarreled infantry rifle that had a longer range and greater accuracy than
did the cavalry carbines. The infantry laid down on the ground to fire their
weapons, making their shots more accurate and providing smaller targets
189
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for their enemies. These soldiers kept their adversaries at a distance, and
their skill in battle tended to anchor the entire line. The center was also
bolstered by Tom Moore and his sharpshooters. These men came from
the pack train, and Crook ordered them to advance 400 yards. In that
position, they were supposed to “pick off as many hostile chiefs as possible
and also make the best impression upon the flanks of any charging parties
which might attempt to pass on either side of that promontory.” These
men did good work, and their skill, cheerfulness, and courage impressed
Lieutenant Bourke who stated they “had no idea what the word, ‘nerves’
meant.”193
The fighting on the right was often intense, and the Sioux and
cavalry charged back and forth against each other. In one such encounter
Sergeant John van Mall, Company A in Mills battalion, “a brave and
gigantic soldier,” ran forward to attack with the cavalry. But he was on
foot, and he was left when the men on horseback withdrew. Soon, “A
dozen Sioux dashed at him.” While a few cavalrymen rode forward to try
to save the soldier, who was in grave danger, “one small misshapen Crow
warrior mounted on a fleet pony outstripped all others.” The Indian scout,
Humpy, “dashed boldly among the Sioux . . . seized the big Sergeant by
the shoulder and motioned him to jump up behind.” Apparently, the
Sioux were too surprised to react rapidly, and the two men made good
their escape. The troopers seemed to revel in the deed much like it had
been an athletic contest, and “the whole line of our battalion cheered
Humpy and van Mall as they passed us on the home stretch.”194
General Crook believed he could turn the tide on his adversaries
by offensive action. The Sioux and Cheyenne had found his command
early in the morning, and the Indians were showing uncommon skill and
aggressiveness. He believed that the Indian village must be nearby, and he
thought he could distract his enemies by striking at their encampment.
When the battle seemed to be less intense, Crook decided to make his
move, and he could use the opportunity “to follow the Indians” and strike
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at their homes.195 If indeed there was a lull in the battle at that point, the
other accounts failed to mention it. Rather than taking advantage of a
break in combat, Crook might have been reacting to his own anxiety. His
horse had been shot out from under him during the battle, he had gained
no advantage in several hours of combat, and he was probably becoming
more desperate to find a way to turn the tide on his enemies.196
At about 12:30 p.m., the General came to Captain Anson Mills and
ordered him to take his battalion which consisted of companies A, E, and
M and strike the Indian camp. Crook explained that Mills’ troops would
be followed by five more companies under Captain Henry Noyes. In fact,
the General was planning to shift his entire command to strike at the
target, and Crook informed Mills that “he had been reliably informed”
that the village “was about six miles down the canyon.” 197 He said, “it is
time to stop this skirmishing. . . . You must take your battalion and go
for their village away down the canyon.”198 When the General spoke to
the scout, Frank Grouard, he sounded less positive on the location of the
village. “I am going to move down Rosebud Canyon and I want you to
go, with two battalions, as far as you can handle the defile and find out
whether the village is at the other end of the canyon or not.”199
This maneuver was based more on wishful thinking than on sound
judgement. Crook had no means to know where the Indian village was
located, and he could not know it was nearby. He probably thought that
the encampment must be within easy reach for his Indian adversaries to
have found him so rapidly and engaged him so resolutely. In actuality,
the camp was perhaps 25 miles away and could only be reached by many
hours of hard riding even if he knew where it was. Logically, the camp of
the Cheyenne and Sioux would be located on a stream, and the General
thought it should be on the Rosebud River. Crook did not know the
location of the village, and redeploying his forces made no sense. In
effect, he was dividing his forces in the face of an aggressive enemy and
195
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a numerically superior enemy. Once his forces were divided, the hostile
Indians could destroy them one at a time. The maneuver was foolish, and
it invited disaster.
When Captain Mills and his men moved away, their Indian
adversaries seemed to think they were retreating and became more bold,
“and fairly hailed bullets after us wounding several soldiers.” One of these
men was a trooper named Harold who received an unusual wound. When
he was aiming his rifle, a bullet struck the barrel of the weapon and flew
the length of the weapon to lodge beneath the skin in the man’s neck.
As the column entered the canyon, Sioux warriors tried to block their
entrance, but they were dislodged by a daring charge by Company E under
Captain Alexander Sutorius and Lieutenant Adolphus von Leuttwitz.
Finerty gave the Swiss and German high praise for their actions, “A body
of Sioux posted on a bluff which commanded the west side of the mouth
of the canyon was brilliantly dislodged by a bold charge of Troop E under
Captain Sutorius and Lieutenant Von Leuttwitz.”200
One of the men in Sutorius’s Company E, Private Thomas Lloyd,
gave a description of the fierce nature of the fight. “It was one of the
hottest places I ever was in. The company was surrounded by Indians
and only that we stuck together and give them the best in the shop, they
would have got away with our scalps.” The warriors fought well, but the
troopers held their own. “They [the Indians] stood and fought within
100 yards until we got six volleys into them and commence to drop them
and their ponies.” Only “then they took a tumble and fell back into the
hills.”201
The Sioux and Cheyenne watched Captain Mills and his men when
they advanced, but they kept their distance. The troopers marched six
miles, and Mills was determined to follow the valley until they arrived
at the village and “hold it until he [Crook] came to my support with the
rest of the command.” The Captain followed his orders until he “reached
the vicinity of the village.” But he had not seen or located the village, and
the Captain was engaged in wishful thinking. Before the column got even
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further separated from Crook’s command, Mills heard a “voice calling
him to halt.” Captain Azor Nickerson had ridden rapidly with new orders
from Crook to return. Mills was very surprised, and he asked the other
officer, “Are you sure he wants me to go back?” Nickerson replied that the
orders were correct.202
The expedition by Anson Mills and his men down the Rosebud
River remains one of the most controversial aspects of the battle because
no one knows if the Indians were trying to entrap the army in the canyon.
The scout, Frank Grouard, accompanied the movement, and he was
convinced that their Indian adversaries had tried to ambush the army.
“They wanted to draw the entire command down into this canyon and
massacre every soul of it.” He stated that he understood the plan when he
rode into the defile: “The canyon rose to a height of 1,000 feet on both
sides of us. The Indians had all of this fortified.”203 The scout exaggerated
the height of the sides of the canyon, but the high terrain could have given
the Indian adversaries a distinct advantage.
Finerty described the surroundings through which the army
marched: “The bluffs on both sides of the ravine were thickly covered
with rocks and fir trees, thus affording ample protection to an enemy
and making it impossible for our cavalry to act as flankers.” He also had
misgivings, and he believed that in any engagement “all the advantage
would be on the side of the savages.” He further speculated that an
Indian attack in that area could have led to the death of all the soldiers.204
According to Grouard, Nickerson’s timely arrival with orders to withdraw
saved the entire command.205
Captain Mills ordered his men to return by a different route than
the advance. He probably thought that his Indian adversaries might have
been waiting for him to retreat back up the canyon, and returning by
a different route could fool any attempt to surprise the army. When he
came to a gentler slope in the canyon, “I found I could climb the rocks
and get out.” He led his command by a wide route that brought him upon
202
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the flank of the Sioux who were fighting on Crook’s right side. This caused
the warriors to flee.206
After a ride of two hours, Mills and his men arrived back with the
main column at about 2:30 p.m. The Captain asked the General for an
explanation of why the senior officer had ordered the withdrawal. Mill
said, “I never saw a man more dejected,” when Crook gave his answer. The
General gave an explanation, “I found it a more serious engagement than
I thought. We have lost about 50 killed and wounded, and the doctors
have refused to remain with the wounded unless I left the infantry and
one of the squadrons [battalions] with them.” In effect, the doctors had
requested that at least one-third of the command be on hand to protect
them and the wounded. Crook admitted, “I knew I could not keep my
promise to support you with the remainder of the force.”207
Frank Grouard believed that he had dissuaded Crook from taking
his entire command into an ambush in the canyon. When the General
stated he was taking his complete force in an effort to find and attack the
village, Grouard protested, “You can’t go through the canyon. . . . They
will kill your whole command if you attempt to go through there.” Crook
did not believe this, and he “laughed quietly” at the suggestion. Grouard
finally tried to convince the General that his command had too little
ammunition to support the attack. When Crook learned that his men
only had ten cartridges each, he realized that “he would have to wait until
he got more ammunition from the wagons before taking the offensive.”
This saved the command from being destroyed.208
Crook’s attempt to dictate the terms of the battle had failed, and
it was the Sioux and Cheyenne who started the engagement and ended
it as well. They left at about the same time as the return of Anson Mills
and his men, but the arrival of this column was probably not the reason
for the Indian withdrawal. Many of the warriors had slept little the
night before, and they had gone into battle with little food and on
tired horses. After about six hours of combat, the Indians were simply
exhausted, and they left.
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Position of forces at the end of the battle.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

While the battle had ended, unfortunately, the killing was not yet
over, because one more Indian was killed the day after the fight. The Crow
scouts were on Crook’s right flank, when they heard someone calling in
the Sioux language, “Mini! Mini!” This was a cry for water. The Crows
found a badly-wounded “Cheyenne whose eyes had been shot out in the
beginning of the battle.” He had crawled away from the fighting and
was hiding among some rocks. He had heard the Crows talking and had
mistaken them for Sioux warriors. The scouts were in no mood to be
compassionate, and “The Crows cut him limb from limb and ripped off
his scalp.”209 In his diary, written shortly after the battle, Bourke was more
explicit. “My informant told me they cut off the legs at the knees, the
arms at the elbows, broke open the skull and scattered the brains on the
ground. This is the manner of treatment all Indians pursue towards their
enemy.”210
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The Swiss Captain, Sutorius, stopped the butchering of a dead
Indian on another occasion as described by Finerty. “As I rode along
with Sutorius and Von Leuttwitz I observed a crowd of Crow Indians
dismounted and standing around some object which lay in the long grass
some distance to our right.” When he and the Lieutenant approached
Finerty “saw the body of a stalwart Sioux warrior stiff in death.” “The
Crows set to work at once to dismember him. One scalped the remains.
Another cut off the ears of the corpse and put them in his wallet.” The
two men “remonstrated but the savages only laughed at us.” But Sutorius
finally put an end to it. “We protested vigorously, and the Captain, seeing
something singular was in progress, rode up with a squad of men and put
an end to the butchery.”211
After the Cheyenne and Sioux had withdrawn that afternoon, Crook
decided not to pursue. He had failed to locate the enemy village, and the
General knew that he still faced a formidable foe who could renew the
battle. His men had lost their optimism for the campaign, confidence was
low, and they were exhausted from the fighting. The army had expended
much of its ammunition, and Crook believed he could not continue to
advance. He needed reinforcements to meet the Indians again, and he also
required more supplies in food and ammunition. The General decided he
must abandon any offensive operations, and he ordered his men to retreat
the following day.
The newspaper reporter, Finerty, summed up the situation well,
“General Crook decided that evening to retire on his base of supplies—
the wagon train—with his wounded, in view of the fact that his rations
were almost used up and that his ammunition had run pretty low. He was
also convinced that all chance of surprising the Sioux camp was over for
the present, and perhaps he felt that even if it could be surprised his small
force would be unequal to the task of carrying it by storm. The Indians
had shown themselves good fighters, and he shrewdly calculated that his
men had been opposed to only a part of the well-armed warriors actually
in the field.”212 Finerty also confirmed that the soldiers had shot a large
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number of bullets, and he stated that they “had fired about 25,000 rounds
of ammunition.” He observed that “it often takes an immense amount of
lead to send even one Indian to the happy hunting grounds.”213

The Dead and Wounded
In his official report, Crook stated, “Our casualties during the
action, were ten killed including one Indian Scout, and 21 wounded
including Captain Guy V. Henry.” He added that he could not properly
estimate the losses suffered by his enemies, but he sated that “13 of their
dead bodies were being left in close proximity to our lines.” Curiously,
Crook gave a different number of fatalities in his autobiography. “We
lost over a dozen men killed and a good many wounded.”214 These totals
were different from the statement Crook made to Captain Mills because
the General said, “We have lost about 50 killed and wounded.” Finerty
agreed with this number and stated, “Our losses, including the friendly
Indians, amounted to about 50.”215 Lieutenant Bourke wrote shortly
after the battle, “the number of casualties of all kinds reported is 57,
including (ten) killed outright, (four) mortally wounded, and many of no
significance.”216 T. B. MacMillan was a newspaper reporter with the army,
and he reported, “We lost ten killed, four mortally wounded, one officer
and ten men dangerously wounded, and about 30 slightly wounded. Lost
16 horses that were shot, and seven carbines.”217
The army officers may have had good reason to minimize their
casualties, so the extent of their losses would not be known. Ben Arnold
was a messenger with the army, and he had no motive to falsify reports.
He stated that the Sioux “succeeded in killing 13 soldiers, five Crows, and
seven or eight Shoshones.”218 These numbers appear to be more believable
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than some of the official reports, which almost always state that only one
Indian scout was killed. The Crow and Shoshone were heavily engaged at
the most critical juncture of the battle, where they would have suffered
the greatest losses.
Frank Grouard also had no military reputation to protect, and he
had fewer reasons to falsify reports. His numbers of casualties were much
higher than the other reports. “To sum up the battle, there were 28 soldiers
killed and 56 wounded. One of the Indian scouts was killed and three of
them wounded. On the Indian [Sioux and Cheyenne] side, there were 13
of them killed that I know of.”219 J. W. Vaughn wrote a thorough history of
the campaign and battle, and he indicated that the government might have
destroyed important documents relating to casualties. The official reports
for the three companies which reportedly suffered the most losses in battle,
were missing from the U.S. National Archives. Additionally, Vaughn has
observed, “It seems incredible that all these men could have fought for six
hours with only the small number killed as stated in the official report. The
statement of Grouard would appear to be closer to the truth.”220
The number of Sioux and Cheyenne who were killed in the battle
may never be known with accuracy. The soldiers could only be sure that
13 of the enemy had been killed because the Indian scouts had taken that
number of scalps from their dead adversaries. As Finerty described, the
Sioux and Cheyenne “picked up their wounded, all but 13 of their dead,
and broke away to the northwest on their fleet ponies, leaving us only
the 13 scalps, 150 dead horses and ponies and a few old blankets and war
bonnets as trophies of the fray.”221 Charles Diehl interviewed a number
of Sioux leaders, including Crazy Horse, a year after the battle, and he
reported, “The Indians say in the latter fight [Battle of the Rosebud] 36
Indians were killed and 63 wounded.”222 This meant a total of 99 warriors
were casualties.
These numbers have contributed to a study by Dave Grossman on
men’s unwillingness to kill in battle. Grossman stated, “General Crook’s
219
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men fired 25,000 rounds at Rosebud Creek on June 17, 1876, causing
99 casualties among the Indians, or 252 rounds per hit.” The author’s
thesis was that the large expenditure of ammunition and the resulting few
casualties were caused neither by the soldiers’ nervousness nor their poor
marksmanship, but by their innate aversion to killing a human being.223 If
accurate, this argument would explain why the army and Indians fought
so long, expended so much ammunition, and inflicted so few casualties on
each other.
The Shoshone boy, who was killed in the battle, was the subject of
much mourning among the members of his tribe. The other Shoshone
warriors made noise of “melancholy wailing” during the night, and they
called “upon the Great Spirt” for vengeance. The next morning the boy
was buried in a grave “dug for the body in the bed of the stream.” After
the corpse was covered with earth, “a group of warriors on horseback
rode over the site several times, thus making it impossible for the Sioux
to find the body.” The corpses of the dead soldiers were hidden in a
similar manner. They were “quietly buried within the limits of the
camp, and every precaution was taken to obliterate the traces” of the
graves. 224
The soldiers dug a deep trench near the bank of the Rosebud Creek
near the water line. The bodies of the dead were laid in a row, “covered
with stones, mud, and earth packed down, and a great fire kindled on top
and allowed to burn all night.” The next morning when the soldiers broke
camp to march away “the entire command marched over the graves, so as
to obliterate every trace and prevent prowling savages from exhuming the
corpses and scalping them.”225
This effort to make sure neither the Sioux nor Cheyenne could
locate the corpses and desecrate the bodies of the dead soldiers proved to
be futile, because the Indians had no trouble finding them. The morning
after the battle about 20 young Sioux warriors, including Standing Bear,
went to the location of the battle and then to the area where the army
Dave Grossman, On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War
and Society, (Boston: Little, 1996), 12.
224
Finerty, War-Path, 146 and 148.
225
Bourke, Crook, 317.
223
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had camped. They noticed a place where the ground was recently dug up
and where a large fire had been built. The young men realized something
important had been buried there, and they dug immediately with their
hands. Soon they found a “blanket and there was a dead soldier in it.”

Warrior taking a scalp from Frontispiece of
‘Wonderous Adventures: A Series of Narratives.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021
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They pulled him out of the ground, and one of the warriors said, “This is
my blanket. I have been looking for this blanket. I will have this blanket.”
He took it. According to Standing Bear, the bodies were buried one on top
of the other, and the Sioux found more corpses under the first. Standing
Bear got the blanket from the fifth body in the stack. The dead soldier
was a young man, and he had a “ring on his finger with a white stone in it
that sparkled.” The warrior cut the finger off the corpse and took the ring.
One Sioux took a scalp from a body, but the warriors apparently left the
remaining corpses unmolested.226

Aftermath and Accusations
The wounded soldiers were treated well, and they were brought
away on travois which allowed them to be transported with as much
comfort as possible. Additionally, six men were assigned to each wounded
man to assure that all his needs were met. The retreat from the Rosebud
River was largely uneventful, and Lieutenant Bourke had little to note
in his diary other than the nights were very cold. The morning after the
battle, June 18, was surprisingly cold, and the soldiers awoke at 3 a.m.
to a hard frost, “which made everyone shiver.” The following morning
was equally cold, “last night was very cold—one of the coldest for a
summer night I ever experienced. Frost covered the ground and our sleep
was interrupted by the intense cold.” The army marched back to the
encampment at Goose Creek on Tongue River and arrived on June 19.
The weather remained worthy of comment. While the weather had been
very cold for two nights in a row, the temperature rose to 103 degrees
Fahrenheit in the shade on June 20.227
While General Crook awaited five companies as reinforcements, he
and his men relaxed for weeks. They bathed, rested, and many of them
spent time fishing. The soldiers caught many hundreds if not thousands
of trout in the cold streams in the area, and fish became an important part
of the men’s diet. Crook was especially pleased to go fishing day after day.

226
227

Standing Bear as cited in Black Elk Speaks, 103-4.
Bourke, Diaries, 331-4 and 339.
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Ironically, on June 25, 1876, “Squads of men and officers constantly pass
Headquarters en route to the canyon a couple of miles above. . . . Trout
are caught there every moment, and some little game of other kinds is
shot.”228
On that exact day, George Armstrong Custer’s 7th Cavalry, less than
70 miles away, was heavily engaged at the Battle of Little Bighorn in
which the command was almost annihilated and about 265 cavalrymen
were killed. Custer’s regiment had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of
the same Indians that Crook and his men had engaged only eight days
before at the Battle of the Rosebud. It was immediately apparent that the
Sioux and Cheyenne had been encouraged by their victory at the Rosebud
and had aggressively engaged the 7th Cavalry a few days later. Crook’s men
were still relaxing and fishing on July 10, only 17 days after the Battle
of the Little Bighorn, when word arrived in camp of Custer’s disaster.
Before then, some of Crook’s men thought they had won a victory at the
Rosebud, but the news of he disaster of the 7th Cavalry caused many men
to change their opinion of the earlier engagement.
The fact that no hostile Indians followed the army either to molest
or harass the soldiers helped Lieutenant Bourke to believe that the
troopers had won a big victory at the Battle of the Rosebud. “The absence
of hostile demonstrations since our fight of June 17th speaks very plainly
of the severe handling the Sioux received that day. Were they victorious
or had the day been even undecided, our camp would long since have
been beleaguered by the sharpshooters.”229 Bourke did not realize that the
Indians had been able to attack the columns converging on them one at
a time. The lack of renewed attacks by the Sioux and Cheyenne on the
soldiers demonstrated that they no longer needed to worry about Crook’s
command, and they could concentrate their forces elsewhere. Anson Mills
presented a better summation of the outcome of the battle. “We then
all realized for the first time that while we were lucky not to have been
entirely vanquished, we had been most humiliatingly defeated.”230

228
229
230

Bourke, Diaries, 343.
Bourke, Diaries, 356.
Mills, My Story, 409.
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Col. Anson Mills, 1876.
Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons.

General Crook had taken his entire army out of the campaign
against the Sioux and Cheyenne by remaining at Goose Creek for weeks.
This meant he had failed to follow his orders and he did not participate
in the pincer movement that was supposed to crush the Indians between
columns of cavalry. Crooks failure exposed Custer and his command
to the force of enemy warriors, which contributed to the disaster at the
Battle of the Little Bighorn.
A reporter for The Daily Independent newspaper in Helena, Montana,
wrote a scathing report on General Crook. The article was dated June 25,
1876, and was sent from Fort Laramie, Wyoming, long before the men at
the post heard of Custer’s defeat. The newspaperman stated the opinion of
many men stationed at the fort. “The officers of the post speak in terms of
unmeasured condemnation of Gen. Crook’s behavior, and denounce his
retreat in the face of the savage enemy as cowardly [italics in the original].”
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol57/iss3/5
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The correspondent further stated that the General had lost the respect of
the Crow scouts who had recently served with him. “They call Crook the
‘Squaw Chief ’ and say he’s afraid to fight.” Many of the soldiers at Fort
Laramie also believed that the battle was “humiliating and disgraceful to
the last degree.”231
Not everyone looked at Crook’s conduct so negatively, and many
others viewed his leadership in the battle more favorably. Many of his
superiors, including Generals William T. Sherman and Phil Sheridan,
stated they still had faith in him and even President Grant agreed,
“General Crook is the best, wiliest Indian fighter in the country.”232 But
these opinions were clearly biased because the military leaders of the
nation, who were making Indian policy, were unlikely to criticize those
where implementing government strategy.
Crook soon came to his own defense by stating erroneously that he had
less than a thousand men in the battle. In reality he had over 1,300 men. He
stated that his command was about the same size as Custer’s 7th Cavalry, and,
if he had pursued the enemy, he would have suffered a similar fate as had
Custer’s men. In reality, Crook’s command had about twice as many men as
the 7th Cavalry at the Battle of the Little Bighorn which numbered about 640
men. The General further said that he won the engagement by driving the
Indians away, but he decided not to pursue his victory because he had to care
for his wounded men.233 Crook’s attempt to distort the truth by changing
the numbers of men in his and in Custer’s commands demonstrated, at least,
that he was a dishonest man if not an outright liar.
Despite the fact that Crook maintained that he had achieved a
victory at the Rosebud, he still blamed some of his subordinates for
not achieving a greater triumph. Ten years after the battle, Crook
confronted Colonel Royall and Captain Nickerson for being slow in
following orders. At that time, the two men defended their actions in
the battle. 234
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“Crook Defeated!” Daily Independent: Helena, June 30, 1867, p. 3 col. 2.
Grant, “Interview,” as cited in Vaughn, Rosebud, 164.
Crook, “Annual Report,” as cited in Vaughn, Rosebud, 164.
Lyman Kennon, “Diary,” 7 Aug. 1886 as cited in Vaughn, Rosebud, 166-7.
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One of the means that Crook attempted to defray criticism was to
engage in another aggressive campaign late in the summer. In his attempt
to regain his reputation, Crook drove his men deep into Montana and
South Dakota under very trying weather conditions in an attempt to
locate an Indian camp they could attack. Faced with starvation, his men
were finally forced to eat their horses. Luckily for Crook’s reputation, his
command stumbled onto an Indian camp at Slim Buttes in the night of
September 9 and 10, 1876. They attacked the settlement. The resulting
easy victory against a weak adversary drew attention away from his defeat
at the Rosebud.235
No matter how General Crook tried to blame others for the poor
leadership at the Rosebud, distract attention from the loss, or state that a
defeat was a victory, he must bear the greatest responsibility for how the
battle was fought. On the morning of the engagement, Crook failed to
reconnoiter the area, and he was easily surprised by his adversaries. He
allowed his men to rest and set their mounts free to graze, meaning that
the horses were far away at the moment when they were badly needed.
Crook was distracted by playing cards when the fighting started, and he
was slow to react to the rapidly developing engagement. Only the quick
reaction by his Indian scouts saved the command from heavy losses or a
complete rout.
During the battle, the General spread his forces over too wide an
area to bring proper fire on the attacking Sioux and Cheyenne, but Crook’s
tactics were most advantageous to the enemy warriors. In attacking on a
broad front, the General effectively divided his forces into small groups,
which allowed his men to be struck in small detachments, meaning that
many men were killed or wounded needlessly. Crook’s attempt to attack
the Indian village, which was nowhere in the area, was the height of
foolishness. In doing so, he had divided his command in the face of a
superior enemy, which could have been disastrous.
The biggest credit for the success of the Indians in the battle must
be given to the Sioux and Cheyenne themselves. These warriors had rode
through much of the night to surprise their adversaries. They dictated the
235

Winkler, Slim Buttes.
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terms of the battle, and their timely maneuvers kept the soldiers confused
and off balance. The warriors engaged and disengaged the troopers at
will, and the battle only ended when the Indians decided to withdraw.
The skill of Crazy Horse and his men had brought success in the battle.
Unfortunately, the Indian victory at the Battle of the Rosebud was only
a temporary accomplishment because the white invaders won the Great
Sioux War late in the fall and in the winter of 1876-7. Within a year of the
Battle of the Rosebud, the Indians were once again living in humiliating
circumstances on federal reservations. The Sioux had lost control of
their sacred lands because of the dishonesty and brutality of the U.S.
government.

End of Sutorius’s Military Career
The Rosebud battle was also at the end of Captain Alexander
Sutorius’s military career. Very unfortunately a “whiskey peddler” came
with a wagon train that brought supplies to Crook’s summer camp near the
modern town of Sheridan, Wyoming, in July 1876.236 The use and abuse of
alcohol was a serious issue in the United States in the nineteenth century,
and the army had many problems with soldiers being drunk on duty. This
was especially true when the men had been on long, trying campaigns,
and they were trying to take the edge off their misery. Additionally, many
soldiers, who had been long in the service and had suffered psychological
trauma from the impact of deprivations and combat, sought some relief
from their challenging mental conditions in liquor.237
There can be little surprise if Captain Sutorius had fit within these
conditions because of his lengthy military service of 22 years, including
four years in the Civil War, yet his record to that point had been exemplary.
At some point, the Swiss found the temptation of liquor that summer too
much to bear, so he overindulged and became inebriated. He was soon
Vaughn, With Crook, 180.
For a discussion of such problems at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, see
Albert Winkler, “Panic, Erratic Behavior, and the Psychological impact of the Battle of
the Little Bighorn on the Soldiers” Swiss American Historical Society Review 55 (2019)
2: 47-74.
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arrested for being drunk on duty and failing to place the sentries of the
regiment. This was a serious charge because lookouts had to be stationed
to warn the army of any serious threat.238
The accusation read: “Charge. Drunkenness on duty in violation of
the 38th Article of War. Specification. In this that he, Captain Alexander
Sutorius, 3d Cavalry, a portion of the Big Horn and Yellowstone
Expedition, in the field, was so much under the influence of intoxicating
liquors as to be unfit for proper performance of his duty. This when an
attack by hostile Indians at any moment might be expected in the camp
of Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition, on Middle Goose Ck, Wy. On
or about the 22d of July 1876.”239
Colonel William B. Royall sent the charges to General Crook
asking that the matter be moved forward immediately. Crook agreed, and
the court martial took place only two days after the offense was listed.
Apparently, the evidence was conclusive, and the Swiss was found culpable.
The punishment was swift and severe. He was discharged from the army
effective September 25, 1876. This ended Sutorius’s military career. The
Swiss went with his family to New York City, his wife’s hometown, where
he spent much of the rest of his life and where he found employment as a
storekeeper. He died on May 19, 1905.240
With the exception of his indiscretion of getting drunk while on
duty and the dereliction of his assignment, he had done good service in
the army of the United States, his adopted country, especially at the Battle
of the Rosebud in 1876.
						

~ Utah Valley University

“Fiddler’s Green: Alexander J. Sutorius” www.regularcavalryinthecivilwar.com
accessed on January 27, 2021.
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Obituary
Dr. Hans Heinrich
Kuhn, 97, died on
May 11th, 2021, at his
home in Summit Hills
Spartanburg. Born in
1924 in Niederuzwil,
Switzerland, he was
the son of the late
Werner and Gretel
Kuhn and husband of
Edith Kuhn Peyer from
Zurich,
Switzerland.
Dr. Kuhn was educated
in Switzerland and
received his master’s
degree in Chemical
Engineering from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in
Zurich, Switzerland. He received his PhD degree in organic chemistry
from the ETH in 1953. After four years of postdoctoral research, he
immigrated to the United States in 1957 and was employed by W.R.
Grace and Co. in Boston Mass.
In 1960, Dr. Kuhn joined the Milliken Research Corporation
and worked in various positions. He was named a Milliken Research
Fellow in 1995 and retired after 40 years of service. After his retirement,
the Milliken Research Corporation created the Kuhn Award, given
yearly for exceptional achievements in research. In 1997, he received
the Olney medal from the American Association of Textile Chemist
and Colorists for outstanding achievement in textile or polymer
chemistry of major importance to textile science. In the same year, he
also received the SEAM award from the Polymer Research Institute of
102
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021

105

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 57 [2021], No. 3, Art. 5

Obituary

103

the Polytechnic Institute of New York University (formerly Brooklyn
Poly) for leadership in the development of technological applications of
conducting polymers.
From 1970 to 1995, Dr. Kuhn served as Honorary Consul of
Switzerland for the cities of Spartanburg, Greenville, Columbia in
SC, as well as Charlotte and Asheville in NC. He has been honored as
Palmetto Gentleman by Governor John C. West in 1973, and Knight of
the Queen City of Charlotte by Mayor John Belk in 1977. He received
the International Human Relations Award from the city of Spartanburg
in 1986. He is also past president of the Swiss American Society of
the Piedmont and past treasurer of the Arts Partnership of Greater
Spartanburg (formerly Arts Counsel).
He was a member of the First Presbyterian Church, North
Spartanburg Rotary Club, and Swiss American Society of the Piedmont.
In his youth, he served as district scout leader in Zurich.
Surviving are his son John Kuhn and wife Karin of Princeton,
N.J., and their children, Stephanie Harding with her husband Robert,
and their son, Anthony, and Sabrina Maloney with her husband Sean
and their son Logan. His daughter Barbara Mueller and her husband
Willi with their children, Annelies Mueller-Neuhaus with her husband
Matthias, and their daughter Kaia, Christine Mueller, and Mathias
Mueller, all of Switzerland.
Funeral services will be held on Thursday, May 20, 2021, at
11:00 AM in the main chapel of the First Presbyterian Church. We
invite you to join us in the celebration of a life lived to the fullest. To us
he is best remembered as a devoted family man, a brilliant chemist, a
generous person, who recounted wonderful stories of his long life, with
humor and wit.
In lieu of flowers, memorials may be made to Mobile Meals,
419 East Main Street, Spartanburg SC 29302.
						~ Spartanburg Herald
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